

**AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-CORRUPTION
STRATEGIES AT THE DIRECTORATE OF ROAD TRAFFIC AND SAFETY
SERVICES**

**MASTER OF ARTS (PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT)
THESIS**

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**UNIVERSITY OF MALAWI
CHANCELLOR COLLEGE**

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Submitted to the Department of Political and Administrative Studies, Faculty of
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Arts (Public Administration and Management)

**UNIVERSITY OF MALAWI
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MAY, 2019

DECLARATION

I, the undersigned hereby declare that this thesis is my own original work which has not been submitted to any institution for similar purposes. Where other peoples' work has been used acknowledgments have been made.

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CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

The undersigned hereby declare that this thesis is the student's own unaided work which has not been submitted to any other institution for similar purposes. Where other people's work has been used acknowledgements have been made.

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DEDICATION

To my husband, Davis Tayanjana Bonga and my three lovely children: Mzati, Nthambi and Cholinga for their continued support and understanding.

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ABSTRACT

This study assessed effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies that are implemented at the Directorate of Road Traffic and Safety Services (DRTSS). Specifically, the study analysed the concept of corruption, anti-corruption strategies, their effectiveness and challenges. The study adopted a mixed research method of collecting and analysing data. The study established that corruption still exists at the DRTSS despite devising several anti-corruption strategies. It was also found out that history and social cultural aspect of corruption in Malawi, the presence of middle persons and poor internet connection are the major causes of corruption at the DRTSS. The study found out DRTSS devised the following anti-corruption strategies: Fraud and Corruption Prevention Policy, computerized service delivery, among others. Among these strategies, computerization proved to be effective.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACB	Anti-Corruption Bureau
CCAP	Church of Central Africa Presbyterian
CEDEP	Centre for the Development of the People
CHRR	Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation
AU	African Union
CPA	Corrupt Practices Act
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
CRD	Community Relations Department
CSR	Centre for Social Research
DRTSS	Directorate of Road Traffic and Safety Services
ESCOM	Electricity Supply Corporation of Malawi
ICAC	Independent Commission Against Corruption
ICT	Information Communication and Technology
MACRA	Malawi Communication Regulatory Authority
MRA	Malawi Regulatory Authority
NACS	National Anti-Corruption Strategy
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
SADC	South Africa Development Community
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
TI	Transparency International
UNDP	United Nation Development Programme
UNCAC	United Nation Convention Against Corruption

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Firestone (1987) as cited in Creswell (2009, p. 40) suggests that defining terms adds precision to a scientific study, as words of everyday language are rich in multiple meanings. Below are the key terms, which will be in constant use in the thesis.

Corruption: Corruption is defined as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain (Transparency International, 2012).

Effectiveness: The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2008) defines effectiveness as the extent to which the activities stated in the objectives have been met.

Strategy: A method or a plan of action chosen to bring about a desired future, Such as achievement of a goal or a solution to a problem (www.businessdictionary.com/definition/strategy.html sourced on 25July 2017). In this research, the term strategy will be used interchangeably with the term measure to mean efforts or initiatives taken by the institution to combat corruption. What is a strategy against corruption? Klitgaard (1988, p. 27) says that the beginning of the answer is that a strategy focuses on corrupt systems, not (just) corrupt individuals. In other words, instead of thinking about corruption in terms of an immoral individual breaking the law and violating a trust (which are true), one thinks about systems that are more and less susceptible to various illicit activities.

Public Sector: The public sector or the state is the government with all its ministries, departments, services, central/provincial/local administrations, parastatals businesses and other institutions. The public sector is composed of two core elements; at the political level, there are the political institutions where policies are formulated and the (major) decisions are made, and at the administrative level, there is the public sector administration, which is in-charge of implementing these policies and decisions (Amundsen and Andrade, 2009). This implementing level is also called the civil service or state administration or bureaucracy. The distinction between politics and administration is not entirely clear because the administration also has some discretionary powers (Amundsen and Andrade, 2009, p. 10). Public sector activities range from delivering social security, administering urban planning, organizing national defense, issuing licenses, providing health services to schools, construction of roads to provision of water.

The Directorate of Road Traffic and Safety Services: The Directorate of Road Traffic and Safety Services established under the Road Traffic Act of 1998 is one of the government institutions that generate non-tax revenue for operations of the state through payments for vehicle Certificate of Fitness tests, issuance of driver's licenses and vehicle registrations (Malawi Government, 1998).

Broker: A person who serves as a trusted agent or intermediary in a commercial transaction (www.businessdictionary.com>definition).

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Corruption is a universal problem which has negatively impacted many developing nations. However, its level differs from country to country depending on the strategies employed to fight its occurrence. A study by the Transparency International on the prevalence of corruption revealed that the less developed countries are not performing well in the fight against corruption in their respective public sectors (Transparency International, 2012). Subsequent results of some studies undertaken by the Transparency International reveal that there is a close relationship between the level of corruption and the level of development of the country. Kamanga (2013, p. 153) agrees with the above observation that “indeed the term corruption has become a key word in determining a country’s world standing in terms of its peoples’ financial morals and a capacity to deliver in terms of distribution of wealth.” The impact of corruption has forced many nations to undertake a step further to fight corruption by developing anti-corruption measures.

This study focuses on assessing effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies at the Directorate of Road Traffic and Safety Services (DRTSS) in Malawi. The study selected this institution because it is a public institution that interacts with the general public on daily basis in the course of offering services. It was also chosen because it is one of the public institutions which has devised measures aiming at reducing corruption. This chapter therefore covers the following: background to the study, problem statement, research questions, research objectives, research assumption,

significance of the study, limitations of the study, delimitation, short definitions of key terms, structure of the study and summary.

1.2 Background and Rationale

Corruption is not a new phenomenon; it is an ancient and persistent feature of human society with earliest reference dating back to fourth (4th) Century B.C. (Aidi, 2003 & Bardhan, 1997 as cited by Pinto, Leona & Pil 2008, p. 685). With the long standing existence, indeed corruption affects every aspect of society; for example, it hampers both public and private institutions. Corruption brings serious consequences that manifest themselves in different dimensions relating to political, economic, social and environmental among others in a country. There is a general consensus among scholars that corruption retards democracy and rule of law, reduces political competition and undermines institutions and government legitimacy (Burge, & Holland, 2006, p. 45). The economic effects of corruption are that it leads to the depletion of national wealth and causes inflation (Klitgaard, 1988, Treisman, 2000&Yadav, 2015). Corruption perpetuates poverty as people spend their meagre earnings on bribing public officials in order to access basic services instead of using them for self-development (Tanzi, 1998, p. 27). According to one such contrary argument, corruption can be beneficial to the functioning of the economy (Tanzi, 1998, p. 3). Leff (1964) expound Tanzi (1998)'s argument by stating that corruption can promote efficiency; thus, when it removes government-imposed rigidities that impede investments and interfere with other economic decisions favourable for growth. Leff (1964) continues to state that corruption oils the machinery or greases the wheels on economic growth, especially in cases where the public institutions are weak; it can make the bureaucrats work harder because bribes motivate them. It is

further argued that corruption has the ability of promoting efficiency in bidding competition as those who are most efficient can afford to offer the highest bribes (Beck & Maker, 1986). Lui (1985 as cited by Tanzi, 1998, p. 25) claims that not only can corruption be efficient because it saves time but it also supplements low wages and allows governments to maintain a low tax burden which can favour growth. However, a counter argument on the last premise is that “these rigidities are not exogenous and unmovable features of a society; public officials intentionally create them in order to extract bribes” (Tanzi 1998, p. 25). Tanzi (1998) further argues that it is not correct to promote corruption because of promotion of efficiency; moreover, a critical analysis of this may reveal that those who pay bribes in bidding competitions provide poor services to cover up for the money that they used to pay bribes.

Despite having a positive side as argued by different authors above, there is a general consensus that corruption is bad for the development of a country. That is why; there is commitment and willingness from the international community to discuss issues of corruption in an open and transparent manner (Mauro, 2007, p. 69). Furthermore, the above-mentioned serious impacts of corruption have prompted many nations, including Malawi, to prioritize and join international efforts to combat the scourge. The efforts include countries signing and ratifying international instruments that promote the fight against corruption at global, continental and regional level. The instruments among others are the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol (2001), the United Nation Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) (2003) and the African Union (AU) Convention against Corruption (2003). These international instruments urge Member States to formulate strategies at both national and institutional/sector level in order to reduce or eliminate corruption.

Local reports indicate that corruption in Malawi, especially in the public sector, has left a negative mark in all corners of life. The negative perception of Malawians towards public sector corruption has also increased in recent years as evident by the current results of Round Seven (7) of the Afro-barometer survey in 2017. The survey revealed that more than seven out of ten Malawians (72%) said corruption had increased over the past year, including two-thirds (66%) saying it had increased “a lot.” Results of successive Transparency International (TI) surveys have also revealed on how corruption in the Malawian public sector has risen. For consecutive years; thus, from 1999 to 2017, TI’s studies rated Malawi as one of the most corrupt countries in the world.¹Figure 1 shows Malawi’s poor performance on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) as the rank keeps on increasing from 110, 112, 120 and 122 in 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017 respectively.




Figure 1: Malawi’s ranking on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index from 1999 to 2017, Source: Bonga (2018).

Between 2009 and 2010, Malawi registered an improvement in the CPI ranking; thus, from position 115 in 2008 to positions 89 and 85, in 2009 and 2010 respectively.

¹www.transparencyinternational.mw

Probably, it was because of political leadership as the then President Bingu wa Mutharika had declared zero-tolerance on corruption. This perhaps indicated a political willingness to fight corruption. However, such willingness wavered in the period 2014-2017. Perhaps, people's perception towards corruption changed because of the revelation of the mismanagement of public funds popularly known as 'cash gate scandal' in the public sector in 2013. The Malawi Governance and Corruption Surveys of 2010 and 2013 carried out by the University of Malawi's Centre for Social Research revealed that Malawians perceive the corruption fight to be ineffective despite devising anti-corruption measures since the inception of the 1994 Republican Constitution.

The enactment of the Corrupt Practices Act and the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) are amongst the strategies introduced by the Malawi government in the quest to fight corruption after attaining democracy. However, some analysts have argued that corruption has escalated over the years because there is an existing tendency of leaving the responsibility of dealing with corruption in the hands of a single institution – the Anti-Corruption Bureau (National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2008). The ACB is an independent government institution which was mandated to lead in the fight against corruption (Malawi Government, 1995); however, results of a study done by Kambalu (2015) revealed that ACB is failing to perform its duty because of political interference and lack of political will in its effort to fight corruption (Kambalu, 2015).

Social and political commentators from some religious groupings and Non-Governmental Organisation have over the years openly accused the ACB of failing to

fight corruption in the country (Nyasatimes, 2018). However, the ACB response to the mass accusations is that it bemoans the tendency of Malawians of being spectators when it comes to the fight against corruption (Nyasatimes, 2018)². The ACB claims that Malawians do not normally participate in the fight against corruption but leave everything to the ACB to fight the battle alone. The Bureau reiterates that fighting corruption has become more complex each and every other day as perpetrators are trying their best not to leave trail by the use of technology (Anti-Corruption Agencies Summit, 2017).³ Malawi formulated a National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS) in 2008, which is a multi-sector holistic approach or a plan to fight corruption following the declaration by President Bingu wa Mutharika of Zero Tolerance to Corruption.⁴ One of the objectives of NACS was to reinforce the integration of anti-corruption measures in all public institutions' activities. This is a plan of fighting corruption at the sector level rather than leaving the responsibility to a single institution. In response to this objective, selected public institutions have been launching strategies or measures aiming at fighting corruption in a decentralized way. Recanatini, Prati and Tabellini (2005 as cited in Mauro 2007, p. 74) analysed data collected in eight developing countries and it was revealed that corruption is more prevalent among agencies that provide services to the public for which there is no alternative. The Directorate of Road Traffic and Safety Services is one of the public institutions where the public seek services not provided by any other institution in Malawi.⁵ It is against this background that the researcher instituted a study to assess the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies and measures implemented by the Road Traffic.

²www.nyasatimes.com on 03 August 2017).

³www.nyasatimes.com accessed on 03 August 2018

⁴ 'An Analysis of President Bingu wa Mutharika's 2004 inaugural speech,' 19/04/2012. Accessed at www.faceofmalawi.com on 11 January 2018.

⁵ 'Chikoko, R. 'New face of Traffic Rot' Weekend Nation Newspaper Dated 08/07/2017

1.3 Problem Statement

Since the dawn of multiparty democracy in 1994, Malawi made a commitment to fight corruption, as articulated in the Constitution.⁶In addition to having provisions in the Constitution that promote transparency and accountability; the country also ratified several international instruments that outlined anti-corruption measures in the public sector. The enactment of Corrupt Practices Act (CPA) in 1998 with subsequent amendments in 2004, the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) in 1995 and other related laws that promote accountability and transparency were some of the strategies that Malawi employed to fight corruption. However, despite Malawi having a number of anti-corruption strategies in place but various studies on corruption done by Transparency International and Afro Barometer have revealed that Malawi has not registered positive impact on the fight against corruption. Specifically, one of the Afro-barometer survey findings have revealed a widespread public perception that the country is failing in its fight against corruption (Chunga & Mazalale, 2017, p. 1). Furthermore, Malawi's consistent poor rankings on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) released by the Transparency International (TI) annually is a good example of this failure. Rankings of the CPI released by TI indicate that the period 1998 to 2016, Malawi's corruption ranking averaged at 87.63 – reaching an all-time highest rank of 127 out of 176 countries in 2016 against the lowest position of 43 in the year 2000. Furthermore, frequent reports in local newspapers of ongoing corrupt transactions in the public sector bears testimony to this poor performance on the fight against corruption. A well-known example is the much publicised “Cash gate” scandal that took place in the public sector in 2013; this was a clear demonstration to Malawians on the sheer scale of the corruption problem. This scandal also indicated

⁶Section 12 of the 1994 Republic of Malawi Constitution

that corruption in the country had been increasing over the years despite the ratification of international instruments, enactment of the CPA in 1995, establishment of the ACB in 1998 and other anti-corruption related measures.

The Directorate of Road Traffic and safety Services is one of the public institutions that provide monopolistic services to the public. A 2008 study at the Directorate of Road Traffic and safety Services marked the institution to be a breeding ground of corruption.⁷ Another illustrative example are the 2005 Anti-Corruption Bureau Base Line Survey results, which specifically revealed that the Directorate was one of the most corrupt institutions in the country (National Anti-Corruption Strategy, 2008).

Following the launch of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy in 2008, the Directorate devised several anti-corruption mechanisms aiming at eliminating corruption at the institutional level. However, the reality on the ground is that by 2015, corruption was still prevailing despite all the mechanisms that were put in place.⁸ The 2010 and 2013 Corruption and Governance Surveys conducted by the University of Malawi's Centre for Social Research revealed that the DRTSS was one of the public institutions where prevalence of corruption was still high. An investigative report in the Nation newspaper in 2015 found that sophisticated corruption had become a norm at the DRTSS whereby it was reported that some of the Road Traffic officials were nourishing black markets by corruptly selling official

⁷ National Anti-Corruption Strategy, 2008, Surveys undertaken by the Centre for Social Research in 2010 and 2013 on Governance and Corruption rated Road Traffic as one of the most corrupt institutions, which required targeted efforts to combat corruption

⁸ A three-week long investigation established that people who have never driven a motor vehicle were able to obtain a valid driving license after corrupting the system (Not The Nation 2015)

security documents illegally.⁹ It is the above mentioned reports on prevalence of corruption at the DRTSS that triggered an interest in the researcher to assess the effectiveness of the anti-corruption strategies implemented at the DRTSS from 2015 to 2017.

1.4 Research Questions

For the better understanding of the problem under research, the following questions were answered during the study:

- What constitutes the concept of corruption at the Directorate of Road Traffic and Safety Services?
- What are the factors that trigger corruption at the Directorate of Road Traffic and Safety Services?
- What anti-corruption strategies is the Directorate of Road Traffic and Safety Services implementing?
- To what extent are those anti-corruption strategies the Directorate of Road Traffic and Safety Services is implementing effective?
- What are the main sets of challenges faced by the Directorate of Road Traffic and Safety Services in the implementation of the anti-corruption strategies?

1.5 Objectives of the Study

The overall objective of the study was to assess the effectiveness of integrated anti-corruption strategies at the Road Traffic.

Specifically, the study had the following objectives;

⁹ The weekend Nation newspaper of 08 July 2017

- To analyse the concept of corruption in the context of the Directorate of Road Traffic and Safety Services.
- To investigate the causes of corruption at the Directorate of Road Traffic and Safety Services.
- To analyse anti-corruption strategies implemented by the Directorate of Road Traffic and Safety Services since the introduction of National Anti-Corruption Strategies.
- To examine effectiveness of anti-corruption measures implemented at the Directorate of Road Traffic and Safety Services.
- To explore challenges, the Directorate of Road Traffic and Safety Services confronts in the implementation of the anti-corruption strategies.

1.6 Significance of the Study

The study is believed to be of importance to public administration in Malawi. Positively, the study will enable DRTSS to revisit their anti-corruption strategies and see if there will be need to seal loopholes, retain or introduce other strategies altogether, in order to reduce the scourge.

The study will also assist the ACB, which champions anti-corruption strategies in public institutions following the launch of the NACS to revisit its anti-corruption programmes at DRTSS and other public offices.

The Malawi Government in general will be another beneficiary of this study as it will be able to revise the National Anti-Corruption Strategy in order to deal with corruption. The research findings will also add value to the literature on effectiveness

of mainstreaming anti-corruption strategies in the Malawian public sector. This will serve as a reference material for students, researchers and academicians.

1.7 Limitation of the Study

Due to sensitivity of the topic, the researcher faced more challenges than anticipated, especially in relation to securing interview appointments with public officials at the Road Traffic in Blantyre. Respondents were also not comfortable to respond to the questionnaire such that some turned down the interviews despite accepting the request in the first place. In order to overcome these challenges, the researcher widened her scope of research by interviewing one key informant from DRTSS, three key informants from ACB offices in Mzuzu, Blantyre and Zomba cities. The researcher also interviewed an investigative journalist from a notable media institution, an MRA Officer and DRTSS officers as well as by examining related documents such as Client Service Charter, Fraud and Corruption Prevention Policy for DRTSS. The researcher also analysed both online and hardcopy local newspapers and results of studies by research institutions such as Afro-Barometer and Centre for Social Research reports.

1.8 Overview of the Thesis

The remainder of the thesis is arranged as follows: Chapter two reviews literature which includes the theoretical framework for the thesis. Chapter three presents the methodology of the study. Chapter four provides the analysis and discussion of the findings. Finally, chapter five provides a summary of the findings, suggestions for future studies and a conclusion.

1.9 Chapter Summary

The chapter has introduced the study on anti-corruption strategies employed in Malawi. The chapter has also presented the background to the study on anti-corruption strategies, the problem statement, the research questions, objectives, limitation and delimitation of the study, definition of key terms, structure of the paper and summary of the chapter. The next chapter presents what other scholars and authors have researched and reported on the topic.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The chapter first presents an analytical discussion on the definition of corruption followed by a review of related literature on the causes and types of corruption. The chapter further provides a critical review of anti-corruption strategies being followed by several countries in the world. Furthermore, the chapter reviews the literature on different anti-corruption strategies with focus on Sub-Saharan Africa. The chapter further reviews the literature on indicators of effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies, the challenges faced in implementing anti-corruption measures. The chapter finally draws both conceptual and theoretical frameworks of the study.

2.2 Defining corruption

In order to assess the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies in the public sector, it is important to understand what constitutes the phenomenon. Scholars agree that there are many ways of defining corruption as people understand it differently. However, corruption is widely defined as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain (The Transparency International (1999) & World Bank, (2006)). Luo (2005) defines corruption as “an illegitimate exchange of resources involving the use or abuse of public or collective responsibility for private ends” (as cited by Schultz & Harulyunyan, p. 87). Schultz & Harulyunyan (2015, p. 87) defines corruption as “any individual or collective or structural act or process that permits the use of public

authority or position for private gain. Johnston (2005, p. 12) concurs with Schultz & Harulyunyan (2015) that corruption is “the abuse of public roles or resources for private benefits. However, Johnston (2005) is quick to admit that the terms “abuse”, “public”, “private” and “benefits” which are found in numerous definitions of corruption, are matters of contention in many societies with varying degrees of ambiguity. This means that what is considered to be abuse of public, or private benefits in one society might not mean the same thing in another society; for example, private means, personal, or a group or society.

Article one (1) of SADC Protocol (2001, p. 2) offers a comprehensive definition of corruption as “any act which includes bribery or any other behaviour in relation to persons entrusted with responsibilities in the public and private sectors violating their duties as public officials, private employees, independent agents or other relations of that kind and aimed at obtaining undue advantage of any kind for themselves or others.” The definition by the SADC Protocol gives a leeway to include behaviours that can benefit others too; for example, rigging of elections in order for a party to win. The definition does not particulate the public sector corruption; it realizes that corruption also takes place in the private sector by those who hold official positions too. However, this definition does not isolate different forms of corruption as compared to what other definitions have done.

Banik (2010) points out that although corruption is often used interchangeably with related terms such as embezzlement, extortion, fraud, favouritism and nepotism, it is a separate concept and these are just related terms. Banik (2010) cites Amundsen (1999) to back his point that embezzlement is not typically considered to be a corrupt

act from a legalistic point of view; as it involves theft of public resources by public officials and constitutes the misappropriation of public or private company funds. However, Banik (2010) agrees that extortion is a corrupt act that entails the extraction of money or other resources by the use of threat, force and violence (Banik, 2010, p.51). He further agrees that fraud is a broad legal term which includes, ‘trickery, swindle or deceit, entailing both ‘bribery’ and embezzlement and by entailing the receipt of benefits with the help of deceit and swindle. Much as Banik (2010) agrees with Amundsen (1999) that embezzlement is not typically considered to be a corrupt act, he disagrees with other authors and scholars who argue that corruption involves acts such as nepotism, extortion, externalization of public funds into foreign countries, patronage, speed money, payment to ‘ghost workers’, ‘ghost’ projects, ‘ghost’ inspections, embezzlement, illegal diversion of relief items, and clientelism over invoicing (DFID, 2015&Hussein, 2005).

A previous study by Khan (1996) as cited in Lawal (2007) defined corruption as an act that deviates from the formal rules of conduct governing wealth, power or status. Whereas Khan (2006, p. 3) points out that “corruption takes place when public officials break the law in pursuit of their private interest.” In its legislation that regulates corrupt practices, the Corrupt Practices Act (1995,p. 3) does not necessarily define the term corruption but describes corrupt practices as “the offering, giving, receiving, obtaining, or soliciting of any advantage to influence the action of any public officer or any official or any other person in the discharge of the duties of that public officer, any official or another person.”¹⁰Corruption is also described as a behaviour that breaks some rules written or unwritten about the proper purpose to

¹⁰ The Corrupt Practices Act 2004 Amended

which a public office has been put (World Bank, 2008, p. 4). UNDP (2007) describes corruption as the misuse of public power, office or authority for private benefit through bribery, extortion, influence peddling, nepotism, fraud, speed money or embezzlement.

Most people equate corruption with bribery, and bribery is defined as an illegal payment made to a government official in return for some type of official, state-sanctioned duty that in the absence of that secret payment would not otherwise have been made (Johnston, 2005, p. 18). However, besides bribery, corruption also includes kickbacks which operate much like a bribe, but where the illegal payment is made after the services is rendered, usually from a portion of the government award itself (Morris, 2011, p. 10). Extortion is where the public official threatens to use (or abuse) state power to induce payment of a bribe. Corruption also involves graft and embezzlement where public officials act alone to misappropriate public funds or divert their use (Morris, 2011, p. 10). Closely related to graft is fraud which refers to various but often complex and imaginative schemes orchestrated by officials to misappropriate public funds, often with civilian accomplices such as establishing fake companies, listing ghost workers to pay rolls, overbilling government on contracts or otherwise fixing the books to hide the disappearance of public funds (Morris, 2011, p.10). Besides the above forms of corruption, it also encompasses such diverse activities as nepotism, favouritisms, and conflict of interest where public sector jobs or benefits are channelled to family, friends or to the decision maker's own interests (Morris 2011, p. 10). However, Begovic, (2005) disagrees with Morris (2011) and agrees with Banik (2010) as to what constitutes corruption stating that it excludes theft, embezzlement and fraud.

Ojaide (2000) as cited in Lawal, (2007) came up with his own comprehensive description of corruption as a systematic vice in an individual, society or a nation which reflects favouritism, nepotism, tribalism, sectionalism, undue enrichment, amassing wealth, abuse of office, power, position and derivation of undue gains and benefits. Lawal (2007) further advocates that corruption includes bribery, smuggling, fraud, illegal payments, money laundering, drug trafficking, falsification of documents and records, window dressing, false declaration, evasion, underpayment, deceit, forgery, concealment, aiding and abetting of any kind, to the detriment of another person, community, society or a nation. Lawal (2007) agreed with what Morris (2011) advocated as to what corruption is while at the same time disagreed with what (Begovic, 2005) suggested as to what constitutes corruption.

In view of the above, it is justifiable to conclude that indeed corruption is a multifaceted phenomenon which manifests itself in different forms and the definitions differ from society to society and country to country. However, the current study adopts the UNDP (2007) definition as a workable definition because it provides a general overview and encompasses all forms of corruption that are absent in other definitions. Even though this definition has been adopted, the weakness is that it defines corruption as misuse of public power, thus focusing more on public sector corruption disregarding the fact that corruption is also prevalent in the private sector. As such, the best definition to adopt could have been the one provided by the SADC Protocol (2001) which also incorporates private sector corruption. However, the adoption of the UNDP (2007) definition becomes much more relevant to the present case study because it focuses on assessing the success of anti-corruption strategies in a public institution.

The most important thing to note in all these definitions is that there are the following common elements as regards corruption; an individual or a group of people that demonstrates selfishness by disregarding public interest and concentrating on self-interests. Another element is that there must be an abuse of a position either in a public institution or in a private institution. However, a definition of corruption that only focuses on abuse of public position is deficient since private individuals who want to break the bureaucratic chain also initiate corruption.

2.3 Categories of corruption

All the definitions reviewed above are not distinguishing the common types or categories of corruption being practised worldwide. However, some of the definitions are admitting that corruption manifests itself in various forms and instantly incorporate these various forms of corruption into their definitions. Just like the way corruption is defined differently; there are also different categories of corruption. Distinguishing corruption can be useful when it comes to designing and developing programmes and strategies aiming at fighting against it (Langseth, 1999). This is because the strategists may be able to know the specific kinds of strategies to devise in order to deal with a specific kind of corruption. Analysts have identified a number of dichotomous categories of corruption. There are therefore different approaches used to categorize the forms of corruption. For example, categories based on institutional location and function of the public official involved, direction of influence, size and frequency of the transaction (Morris, 2011) and motive for engaging in corruption. Other types or categories of corruption are demand versus supply corruption, conventional versus unconventional corruption.¹¹

¹¹ Canadian Research Brief No. 48

2.3.1 Political Versus administrative corruption

This is a category of corruption, which is based on institutional location of the actor and norms known as political versus administrative or bureaucratic corruption (Morris, 2011). This type of corruption takes place within the executive arm of government, legislature, judiciary, customs, local government, the police and other public institutions. This type of corruption is categorised into two levels; upper and lower levels (Morris, 2011). The higher level corruption involves highly powered elected members of the society such as the president, ministers, members of parliament and other high- ranking elected officials. In strict sense, political corruption involves political decision-makers and it takes place at higher levels of the political system (Amundsen & Andrade, 2009). This is when politicians and state agents who are entitled to formulate laws aimed at safeguarding public interests end up becoming corrupt. According to Andvig and Fiedstad (2001) as cited in DFID 2015, p. 12) such public officers use their political power, status and wealth to manipulate the political institution, rules and procedures to enrich themselves. Political corruption has devastating consequences because it leads to misallocation of resources and negatively affects the decision-making process in the public sector (Amundsen and Andrade, 2009). Despite the fact that political corruption can be practiced in developed countries as it is usually associated with an electoral process; it is however, predominantly common in developing countries. These acts include; voting irregularities, nepotism, rule of a few, false political promises, paying journalists for favourable coverage of candidates, distribution of hand-outs by political parties in order to influence voters and holding on to power against the will of the people.¹²

¹²<http://anticorruption.info/types.htm> accessed on 22/12/2017

On the other hand, administrative corruption takes place at the implementation stage of policies. Bardan (2006 as cited in Morris 2011, p. 11) categorized administrative corruption as a lower level corruption which involves non-elected officials employed in the public sector organizations that are directly in touch with members of the general public such that it is sometimes known as ‘survival’ corruption or corruption of ‘need’ as it involves small amounts (Bardan, (2006), Scott, (1972) as cited in Morris 2011, p. 11). Due to their different functions within the system, Political and administrative forms of corruption involve the violation of first order norms (the written second order norms (often unwritten guidelines determining how politicians should make decisions such as impartiality and fairness) (Warren, 2004, as cited in Morris, p. 11).

2.3.2 Grand corruption versus petty corruption

This approach is based on characteristics of the transaction and is essentially a typology based on the relative size and frequency of the corrupt acts. This distinction is commonly expressed in terms of “grand” versus “petty” corruption. Grand corruption consists of acts committed at a high level of government that distorts policies or the central functioning of the state, enabling leaders to benefit at the expense of the public good (Amundsen and Andrade, 2009). Usually it involves large sums of money but usually less frequent transactions (Morris, 2011). Petty corruption, on the other hand, refers to smaller and routine payments, acceptance of gifts, and nepotism in return for service provision (Heidenheimer, Johnston & LeVine 1989 and Hussein, 2005). This type tends to take place among low levels involving bureaucratic workers who regularly interact with the public.

Both grand corruption and petty corruption are subcategories of conventional corruption. However, grand corruption involves higher-ranking government officials and elected officials who exploit opportunities that are present through government activities. It is more often a result of bribes offered or paid in connection with large-scale government projects such as infrastructures and construction (Morris, 2011). On the contrary, junior or mid-level agents who may be heavily underpaid and who depend on relatively small but illegal rents to feed their families and pay for their children's education pursue petty corruption. This includes, for example, Road Traffic officers asking for bribes in order to process a Certificate of Fitness for a motor vehicle without following required procedures. Although petty corruption usually involves much smaller sums than those that change hands in the acts of grand corruption, the amounts are not perceived as small by the individuals that are adversely affected. Overall, petty corruption disproportionately hurts the poorest members of the society who face requests for bribes regularly in their encounters with officials in public institutions such as hospitals, schools, local licensing and taxing authorities.¹³

From the above explanation, one may be tempted to conclude that petty corruption is equal to bureaucratic corruption but in real sense, these are different categories of corruption as bureaucratic corruption may also involve large sums of money hence qualifying it as grand corruption as well. Bureaucratic corruption is categorised based on the level of the institution while petty corruption is based on the amount of transaction involved.

¹³www.u4.ni.glossary.petty-corruption accessed on 20/11/2017

2.3.3 Conventional versus unconventional corruption

Boisvert, Dent & Quraishi (2014) categorise corruption into conventional and unconventional types. It highlights that conventional corruption occurs when government officials whether higher or lower ranking, illegitimately receive or accumulate an undue advantage for their own personal use disregarding the public interest. There is an element of reciprocity within conventional corruption for both the donor and recipient. Unconventional corruption exists where a public official acts without consideration of the public interest. The goal is to attain a specific personal gain. However, a key difference with conventional corruption is that no relationship or reciprocity exists between parties as there is no clear-cut transaction between the two parties. This includes acts such as misappropriation, embezzlement and breach of trust. In other words, unconventional corruption benefits a single party while in conventional corruption there is some sort of ‘mutual benefits’.

2.3.4 Systematic framework-based type of corruption

Another distinct category of corruption is the one that is based on a broader pattern of corruption within the system. This approach focuses not just on the individual corrupt act but also rather on the context which the act occurs (Morris, 2011). Robinson (1998) identifies three (3) forms of corruption namely: incidental, institutional and systemic corruption. Incidental corruption is a rare type of corruption that is confined to malfeasance on the part of the individual. Institutional corruption occurs largely due to the absence of controls. On the other hand, systemic corruption is a worst type of corruption and reflects situation where corruption is deeply entrenched and pervasive throughout society; thus, it becomes a norm or a culture whereby corrupt behaviour becomes institutionalised among public officials (Hussein, 2005).

According to Hussein (2005), corruption is systemic when it becomes part and parcel of public officials' behaviour and it is at that stage when it becomes a collective action problem. The stage where even citizens accept that they live in a corrupt society and that they have to go with it in order to access public services. Systemic corruption has adverse effects as pointed out by Klitgaard (2000, p. 9) that it generates economic costs by distorting incentives, political costs by undermining institution and social costs are generated by redistributing wealth and power towards the undeserving.

2.3.5 Aspectual based type of corruption

This category of corruption is based on the nature of the corrupt transaction. Alatas (1990 cited in Heywood, 1997, p. 425–26) identifies seven forms of corruption namely: transactive, extortive, defensive, nepotistic, autogenic, and supportive. Each of these forms of corruption is described in the subsequent sentences. Firstly, transactive corruption involves the mutual arrangements between a donor and a recipient. The second one is extortive corruption which implies some form of compulsion usually harming a donor party. The third one is defensive corruption, which refers to the act in which the victim of extortion is compelled to engage in corruption. The fourth one is investing corruption that involves an act with no immediate pay off but an understanding of a favour some time in future; for example, awarding a contract to a company with a promise that the owner of the company will pay tertiary educational fees for kids. The fifth one is nepotistic corruption that relates to family members being given favours like being appointed into positions in the government while people that are more deserving are left out. Sixth one is autogenic corruption, which entails one person acting alone with no official –citizen exchange;

for instance, embezzlement and misappropriation of funds. Finally, supportive corruption refers to acts designed to protect and strengthen the existing corruption.

2.3.6 Direct versus indirect corruption

Pinto-Duschinsky (1985) points that this is an important distinction of corruption whereby direct corruption refers to primarily immediate gains from bribery, extortion and misuse of official information while indirect corruption relates to indirect benefits such as promises of employment (including an appointment to a prestigious position), promotion and transfers, or goods and services at a reduced price or the awarding of contract to certain favoured individuals or groups (Banik 2010, p. 50). The review above has demonstrated that despite having different definitions, corruption is also categorised in different ways. Categorising corruption assists in coming up with corruption preventive strategies that deal directly with the common type of existing corruption. In the forthcoming paragraph, the paper will look at the common factors that trigger corruption.

2.4 Causes of corruption

Having looked at different definitions and types of corruption; it is also important to look at what actually triggers corruption in a society. It is a well-known fact that corruption is a complex phenomenon that is almost difficult to be explained by a single cause. If corruption was caused by a single cause, then the solution or devising of strategies would be simple too (Tanzi, 1998, p. 30). When devising strategies aimed at combating corruption, it is critically essential to unearth and analyse different factors that trigger corruption related to the institution under study. There are

various types of reasons why corruption takes place. Several scholars have come up with various factors that cause corruption.

2.4.1 Social cultural aspect of the society

Treisman (2009, p. 5) identifies history and culture as some of the factors that cause corruption. Thus, culture of distrust and private-spiritedness fosters a demand for corrupt services. Some societies are characterised by a high level of trust among its people, while others may lack the same (Lambsdorff,1999). La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny (1997), p. 336 as cited in Lambsdorff, 1999) argues that trust can be helpful in fighting corruption since it helps bureaucrats to better co-operate with each other and with private citizen. In his study of 33 countries, La Porta Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny (1997), reports that the results showed that trust has a significant negative impact on corruption. Treisman (2009) on the other hand argues that when one grows up in a culture that clearly displays that, to get things done on time, you need pay something to speed up the process, it becomes embedded in the mind subconsciously. In this case, corruption perpetrators hardly recognize the illegality of their acts because corruption becomes a normal part of their business.

Hussein (2005, p. 95) points out that “traditional values and customs contribute towards flouting regulation and provide opportunity for nepotism and selectivity in the performance of public duties and where public officials give in to traditional values, opportunities for corruption are immense.” According to Johnson (2005), some social norms and values especially in Africa encourage corrupt practices; for example, a principle of reciprocity, which is premised on returning a favour either in cash or in kind to someone who assisted you at one point. The practice is very much

entrenched in people's minds and it became a norm. Similarly, communism is another social norm that promotes corruption because the society expects someone who is holding a position in either a public institution or private institution to help his or her relatives by offering them the desired service. Munthali (2010) advocates that communism hatches nepotism and favouritism, which are forms of corruption and these practices are common in public institutions.

2.4.2 Economic development

Economic development is another reason why people indulge in corrupt activities. Treisman (2009) exponents that both the demand for and supply of corrupt practices is greater in less developed countries unlike in highly developed countries. The reason could be that people compete to get the basic services as such they pay something to service providers in order to access the basic public services. Furthermore, in less developed countries, motivation to earn more income is extremely strong due to poverty. Availability of opportunities to engage in corruption such as weak legislation and human character may also trigger corrupt behaviour in public officials (Fijnaut and Hubert 2002, p. 87 as cited in Hadnagy, 2012). Most of the time, limited resources force people to scramble for the few resources leading people to indulge in corruption (Marshall, 2011). People are forced to pay bribes to public officials in order to be served. Over the years, many observers have speculated that the wages paid to civil servants are important in determining the degree of corruption (Tanzi 1998, p. 16). For example, Lindbeck (1998) attributes the low corruption in Sweden partly due to high wages paid to public officials. However, it is also argued that high wage may also lead to demands for higher bribes on the part of those who continue to be corrupt. The reason is that much as high wages raise the opportunity cost of losing one's job

but the same high raises do not eliminate greed on the part of some officials. From these contrary arguments, then it cannot be conclusively said that high income contributes to low corruption.

2.4.3 Monopolistic and discretionary power

Klitgaard (1988) and the World Bank (2009) outline some possible causes of corruption such as; when an individual has monopoly over goods or in other words he or she is the only decision maker over services tends to abuse that power. Discretionary power is another factor that triggers corruption (Khan, 2014); for example, the power to decide whether to issue a license or not and time of issuance of a service. Corruption is also possible when there are no systems that may scrutinize how individuals with monopolistic powers arrive at their decisions. Corruption is also possible when institutions are poorly managed or are weak due to processes that lack transparency. Klitgaard, Lindsey-Parris and Maclean-Abaroa (1999, p. 28) further argue that corruption thrives in conditions where there is no accountability; thus, when people cannot check what public officials do. Klitgaard, Lindsey-Parris and Maclean-Abaroa (1999) represents this scenario in a mathematical formula as follows: $\text{Corruption} = \text{Monopoly} + \text{Discretion} - \text{Accountability}$ ($C = M + D - A$).

Tanzi (1998) argues that monopolistic and discretionary powers do not just emerge from nowhere and trigger corruption but they emerge because the regulatory role of the State is often carried out through the use of many rules and/or regulations. He provides an example that in most developing countries, licenses, authorisation of various permits requires citizens to directly engage with public officials. In many activities such as, opening a shop, keeping it open, borrowing money, investing,

driving a car, owning a car, getting a passport among others requires specific documents or authorisation. Very often several government offices must authorise the above activities and several public servants must be contacted (Tanzi, 1998, p. 16). The existence of these regulations and authorizations gives a kind of monopoly power to officials who must authorize or inspect the activities. Since these offices are government-owned and mostly they are single offices that perform those functions; they become monopolistic due to lack of competitors who could perform similar functions. The public officials often have power either to authorize or to withhold authorisation. More often these public officials use the monopoly and discretionary power to solicit bribes. In other circumstances, the users may be forced to pay bribes in order to obtain the services as they cannot get them from anywhere else.

2.4.4 Greed

Wandi (2014) contends that greed and lack of personal integrity are the main cause of corrupt behaviour. This argument is supported by an example of people holding high paying positions but still indulging themselves in corruption. In this scenario, only greed and lack of personal integrity can explain their behaviour. Khan (2006, p. 12) partly agrees with Wandi (2014) that “corruption is largely caused by the greed of public officials who have discretion to offer citizen benefits or cause damage to their activities but who are inadequately monitored or face inadequate punishments for violating laws”. The proposition by Khan (2006) implies that if the bureaucrats or politicians are given power to offer selective benefits or cause selective damage but the risk of detection and of being punished over such activities is low; there is much likelihood that the public officials can indulge themselves in corruption to benefit themselves. Bureaucrats or politicians do not engage in corruption out of poverty but

because the condition is so conducive to indulge into the malpractices and that they want to have more to themselves. Contrary to the proposition by Wandu (2014), Khan (2006) streamlines the corrupt activities only to public officials thus excluding private sector officials. In real sense, the scenario described above can also take place in the private sector if the conditions allow them to indulge themselves in corrupt practices. Khan (2006) further advances that corruption does only take place due to greed of public officials but sometimes the citizens pay bribes to get basic public services and in such a scenario the cause is not greed anymore but personal need.

2.4.5 Poorly managed policies, complicated and unclear rules

Langseth (1999) reiterates some of the contributing factors to corruption such as poorly conceived and mismanaged policies, programs and activities, poverty, income disparities, inadequate civil servant remuneration and lack of accountability and transparency as causes of corruption. The implementers or managers of policies may deliberately mismanage the implementation process with an aim of benefiting from the mismanagement. Begovic (2005, p. 5) argues that complicated and non-transparent legislation specifying slow procedures (procedures with unspecified time limits or no binding deadlines) at the discretion of civil servants in the enforcement process creates a tremendous opportunity for corruption. Such legislations create incentives for corruption and decrease the probability of detection, making threats to the corruptors and corrupted less credible. The lack of time limits creates an opportunity for public officials to work at their own pace, thereby forcing the clients to pay bribes for speedy services.

Based on this background, it can be argued that Langseth (1999) and Wandt (2014) generally disagree on what causes corrupt behaviour in public offices. To some extent Langseth (1999) agrees with Wandt (2014) that greed is the main cause of grand and political corruption as the perpetrators normally are already financially stable and that they indulge in corruption just to maintain the status quo. On the other hand, poverty is mostly applicable in petty and bureaucratic corruption, as the perpetrators engage in the malpractice for survival as pointed out by Morris (2011).

In summary, it has been noted that indeed there are different reasons why corruption takes place and the reasons vary from country to country (Hussein, 2005) and from institution to institution. However, there is a general consensus that corruption mainly happens when the perpetrators are aware that their action will not cost any sanctions. In other words, the perpetrators weigh out the benefits of indulging in corruption and disregard the chances of being caught and punished.

The next section presents some of the anti-corruption strategies which are being implemented in some jurisdictions.

2.5 Anti-corruption strategies

Having looked at the factors that trigger corruption, this section will discuss some of the anti-corruption strategies employed by various nations and institutions. Burge & Holland (2006, p. 50) admit that corruption exists in all countries but forms it carries and attitudes towards it vary from country to country and from institution to institution. As a result, combating it is not a simple task which can be resolved by an adoption of legislation alone. Therefore, there is need for other anti-corruption

strategies to be devised in order to combat it. Anti-corruption strategies are defined as a set of priority objectives to prevent and combat corruption (UNDP, 2014).

2.5.1 Anti-Corruption strategies practiced in least corrupt countries

New Zealand is listed as one of the least corrupt countries in the world on CPI as reported by Transparency International. Since 2010, the TI has been ranking New Zealand on the highest position out of 176 countries for seven consecutive years on Corruption Perception Index.¹⁴ It is therefore proper to understand better the type and nature of anti-corruption measures that New Zealand implements. Some of the measures involve undertaking an assessment of the likely risks of bribery arising from business operations. In addition, New Zealand has clear policies against payment or receipt of bribes by an employee, agent, contractor or other persons associated with an organization and consequences following breaching those obligations. New Zealand puts emphasis on anti-corruption trainings and guidance programmes for staff; establishing whistle blowing procedures for staff to report corruption, including anti-corruption policies in contract and procurement agreements with agents, partners and subcontractors and requiring them to implement similar policies and procedures.¹⁵ A point worthy noting is that some of the anti-corruption strategies employed by New Zealand above are not very unique from what other countries deemed to be highly corrupt developed. However, the difference is the seriousness New Zealand takes in enforcing the measures and the strong consequences that follow if one fails adhere to them.

¹⁴www.transparencyinternational.org accessed on 20/10/2017

¹⁵www.justice.govt.nz accessed on 20/10/2017.

Hong Kong is another country which has also registered a tremendous successful story in the fight against corruption. Klitgaard, Lindsey-Parris, Maclean-Abaroa (1999), reports that Hong Kong did not follow the usual lines of attack. The Hong Kong government adopted a new strategy of setting up a new Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) which was reporting directly to the president and abolished the Police Anti-Corruption Office. ICAC was given powerful investigatory capabilities and emphasized on prevention and citizen participation. An important element in this case is the interest taken by the leadership and government's will in curbing corruption played a greater role. The important step ICAC took to reduce corruption was to deal with high level corruption involving politicians and high-profile public officials. In this case they did not let the strategy to stand idle in books but to take extra efforts to produce results (Klitgaard, Lindsey-Parris and Maclean-Abaroa, 1999, p. 23). ICAC also had a corruption prevention department which had a responsibility for taking a closer look at practices and procedures within government and public utilities through careful examination and analysis of systems, methods, work approach and policies a process known as physical process mapping. The aim was to eliminate and simplify wherever possible all desirable unenforceable laws, cumbersome procedures, vague and ineffectual procedures conducive to corruption. It also set up Community Relations Department (CRD) for the local office to gather information about corruption from civil society as well as to engage in grassroots education activities about evils of corruption. CRD also created school programmes, publicity campaigns, brochures. As a result, systemic corruption in the police force started to reduce (Klitgaard, Lindsey-Parris and Maclean-Abaroa, 1999, p. 24).

Another successful strategy which Hong Kong employed to deal with corruption in city councils was external contracting of some of the services like licensing to competitive markets of professionals who were not necessarily public employees (Klitgaard, Lindsey-Parris and Maclean-Abaroa1999). This strategy aimed at eliminating monopoly power by public officials whom initially the law allowed them to do everything. Another strategy was to improve incentives for public officials so that they should not fail to provide the basic necessities to their families. This strategy aimed at dealing with bureaucratic or petty corruption which public officials practice in order to meet the cost of day to day personal needs. Another strategy was to strengthen linkages between pay and performance and promotion and performance, clarifying official discretion by simplifying rules and regulations, educating citizens on how public systems are supposed to work through brochures, manuals, help desks, laws and rules in ordinary languages, publicity campaigns and improving citizen's oversight functions (Klitgaard, Lindsey-Parris and Maclean-Abaroa, 1999). In so doing, people will not think of paying bribes if they have knowledge of how the government system works, and how the rules and regulations are applied. Clear standards of conduct and obligations enhance accountability.

Amundsen and Andrade (2009) identify general anti-corruption strategies or measures a country can undertake such as strengthening the Parliament and the Judiciary who provide checks and balances to the activities of government. Literature exponents specific preventive measures such as political openness, transparency, asset disclosure by public officials, monitoring public sector contracts, regularizing licenses and concessions, formulating national anti-corruption strategy, free access to information, joint government and civil society regulative bodies formulating civil services

reforms, development of code of conduct for employees (Amundsen and Andrade, 2009) and Lawal (2007). Some of the preventive measures include openness and transparency, result oriented, using positive incentives to improve employee culture and motivation, public complaints mechanism, formulation of national anti-corruption strategies, and citizen service charters among others.

Rose and Montero (2015) discuss various anti-corruption measures a government can undertake to reduce bribery as follows; repealing regulation that reduces the demand for bribery. For example, computerization can improve the efficiency and integrity of issuing permits and licenses as it removes a necessary condition for bribery, personal contact between citizens and a dishonest public employee. Secondly, there is need to repeal laws that restrict freedom of the press to cover corruption in public service delivery. Paying public officials higher salaries is yet another approach adopted at the national level to reduce corruption. The idea behind this approach is that if public officials are paid more, then they will have more to lose if their corruption is discovered (i.e. the effectiveness of anti-corruption policy where corruption has a higher opportunity cost). According to Mookherjee and Png (1995 as cited in Hanna, Bishop, Nadel, Scheffler & Durlacher, 2011), Singapore attributes its corruption-free public sector to the successful implementation of this strategy. Khan (2006) agrees with Mookherjee and Png (1995) that improving salaries of public officials thereby addressing their low living standards in many cases may enhance the opportunity cost of corruption. The officers may fear losing their high paying job if they engage in corruption. However, Harris-White and White (1994) offer contrary evidence that higher salaries and rewards for public officers have been proved unlikely to work unless they are backed up by a credible probability of officials losing out a job if

caught engaging in corruption (as cited in Khan, 2006, p. 14). This strategy's effectiveness differs from one country to another as some countries have proven to be effective while others not. The researcher agrees with Treisman (2000) who says that there is little if any relationship between pay rises for public officials and reduction in corruption. A good example is continued reports of corruption scandals by people in well paid positions such as presidents, the case of Malawi's former president, Bakili Muluzi whose corruption case is still being litigated in the court of law.

2.5.2 Anti-corruption strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa

Corruption is now recognized as global phenomenon, which has to be addressed coherently and consistently, and the need for concerted action in Africa is evident (Lawal, 2007, p. 2). Lawal (2007) further argues that Africa is widely considered as among the world's most corrupt places, a factor seen as contributing to the stunted development and impoverishment of many African States. In addition to that, a 2002 Africa Union study estimated that corruption cost the continent roughly 150 Billion United States Dollars a year (Hanson, 2009). The TI (2017) study established that out of ten countries considered most corrupt in the world, six are in Sub Saharan Africa namely: Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Guinea Bissau, Equatorial Guinea. There are 46 countries in the Sub Saharan Africa and out of that; there are some of the countries, which are some countries, which are also doing well in the fight against corruption; for example, Botswana, Rwanda Namibia and Mauritius (TI Results, 2017). The countries that are considered successful have devised anti-corruption strategies in order to arrest the menace. However, it is also evident that many countries are not doing well despite having anti-corruption laws, policies and

strategies in place. Below is a brief overview of some of the literature on the strategies adopted by some countries in the Sub Saharan region.

2.5.3 Anti-corruption strategies recommended by the African Union

Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2003)

The adoption by the African Union (AU) Assembly of Heads of State and Governments of the Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (Anti-Corruption Convention on 11 July 2003) marked an event of great importance to the continent of Africa. The convention obliged member states to adopt among others, measures to tackle corruption which was approximately costing about Africa \$148 billion annually (The AU Convention, 2003). Specifically, Article five (5) of the Convention requires member states to adopt national legislative measures in order to protect informant who report corruption in good faith; measures to ensure citizens report instances of corruption without fear of consequent reprisals, legislative measures in order to punish those who make false and malicious reports against innocent persons in corruption and related offences. It also requires member States to adopt and strengthen mechanisms for promoting the education of population to respect the public good and interest, by establishing school educational programmes and sensitization of the media and promotion of an enabling environment for the respect of ethics. The Convention further required member states to establish legislation that require public employees to declare their assets at the time of assumption of office, during and after their term of office in the public service. It also promotes the establishment of code of conduct and a committee to monitor implementation, sensitizes, and train public officials on matters of ethics. Finally, it also encourages member states to development disciplinary measures and

investigations procedures in corruption and related offences with a view of keeping up with technology and increase the efficiency of those responsible.

2.5.4 Article 4 of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Protocol against Corruption (2001)

Article 4 of the SADC Protocol reiterates what the AU convention against Corruption obliges its member states to adopt measures that create mechanism to promote access to information to facilitate eradication and elimination of opportunities for corruption. SADC member-states are further urged to develop systems that protect individuals who report acts of corruption in good faith; and to develop laws that punish those who make false and malicious reports of corruption against innocent persons. The SADC Protocol also requires its members to establish institutions responsible for implementing mechanisms for preventing, detecting and eradicating corruption, declaration of assets; develop mechanisms to encourage participation by the media, civil society and non-governmental organizations in efforts to prevent corruption and formulating mechanisms for promoting public education and awareness in the fight against corruption.

These two international instruments commonly emphasize much on the need of having whistle-blowing policies in public institutions with the aim of encouraging people to report issues of corruption without fear of reprisals. Specifically, SADC Protocol encourages member-states to establish anti-corruption agencies to facilitate the elimination of corruption. Most of the countries in Africa have ratified the above instruments and to show its commitments they have devised strategies as per requirement by the instruments.

2.5.4.1 Anti-corruption strategies in Botswana

Botswana is one of the countries in the Sub Saharan region perceived to be the least corrupt (TI results, 2012 to 2017). It is also one of the countries that has been scoring above 60 percent on The Transparency International's CPI for three consecutive years; thus, from 2014 to 2016 whereby it was ranked on position 31, 29 and 35 respectively. In Africa, Botswana tops the list as the least corrupt country. However, the success is due to some of the anti-corruption strategies, which the country developed and adopted from the international instruments. Some of them are the creation of Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) in 1994, which has been crucial with its role in investigating, and enforcement work (World Bank Group 2006).

Another initiative that has contributed to the Botswana's success is the creation of corruption prevention prong which are building blocks of an anti-corruption strategy (World Bank Group, 2006). The role of the corruption prevention prong is to reduce opportunity of corruption in government institution by conducting seminars and workshops with an aim of improving quality management, the prong also assists in the development and adoption of Codes of Conduct and Ethics, Transparency and Accountability corruption prevention measures, corruption risk assessments (DCEC Report, 2013). Another anti-corruption measure implemented in Botswana is the seconding of DCEC officers to other government ministries and departments. These officers are responsible for promoting an anti-corruption culture in ministerial operations by providing in-house anti-corruption advice, evaluating the effectiveness of existing anti-corruption initiatives and forming new anti-corruption committees and building capacity on existing ones. The committees are responsible for facilitating

development of new anti-corruption strategies, keeping constant check on organizational operations and procedures to ensure that there are no opportunities for corruption and to ensure prioritization, integration, coordination and implementation of corruption prevention programs. Finally, sensitize public servants on causes and consequences of corruption and develop positive attitude and behaviour in public service.

In view of the above, it is apparent that Botswana has serious anti-corruption measures, which are not common in other countries. The seriousness of implementation of the strategies is also different from other countries especially the secondment of officers from the Anti-Corruption agency to other ministries; this plays an essential role in dealing with corruption proactively.

2.5.4.2 Anti-corruption strategies in Rwanda

Rwanda is another country in Sub-Saharan region, which has also registered a positive dramatic change in its social economic development like the rise in the Growth Domestic Product (GDP) per capita.¹⁶ This was the result of a holistic approach the country undertook in addressing corruption. A statement by the Minister in charge of Socio-Economic development in the Ministry of local Government in 2013 attributed the country's success in reducing corruption to the collective action by all stake holders. Thus by involving public, private sector and the civil society organizations as paramount to achieve the goal, maintaining zero tolerance to corruption policy, political will and strong political leadership.¹⁷ Results from the

¹⁶www.worldbank.org accessed on 28/10/2018

¹⁷*The Newtimes* (Kigali) 26 January 2017.

Corruption Perception Index compiled by the Transparency International shows the change from the year 2014 to 2016 as it has been ranked as one of the 50 least corrupt countries out of 175 countries according to the 2016 Corruption Perception Index. The CPI also shows that Rwanda moved from position 55 in 2014 to position 43 in 2016. It also shows that in 2015 and 2016, it maintained a score of 54 percent.

One specific institution where anti-corruption strategies are being successfully implemented in Rwanda is the Department of Police. News of Rwanda (2016) outlines strategies that were put in place with an aim of reducing corruption in the Police Services. Strategies like the annual declaration of wealth before, during and after leaving office by all senior police officers and verification of the declaration to ensure that the declared wealth matches with their actual one (Habumuremyi, 2016). Rwanda also has a code of conduct which provides that on every 30th June, the relevant officials such as the director generals in ministries and civil servants in-charge of public funds hand in their assets declaration forms to the Office of the Ombudsman. If one misses the deadline there are various guidelines that outline sanctions. The implementation of this code of conduct goes further to provide guidelines for investigating the origin of assets to make sure that what the concerned public officials declared is what they really have. There are various sanctions which are enforced when one fails to adhere to the provisions in the code of conduct which include suspension, a 25% salary cut, dismissal and prosecution. Habumuremyi (2016) reports that in 2004, some public officials declined to declare their assets but when stiff punishments as outlined above were enforced, everyone started to declare their wealth and did that in time. Some of the strategies that have contributed to the success in fighting corruption in Rwandan Police are the establishment of the anti-

corruption inspectorate of the police service and ethics; police disciplinary unit; annual performance contracts, toll free lines and media to respond to public concerns and receive information as well as complaints of those reporting corruption; punishing perpetrators regardless of the value or amount involved rather the unethical conduct involved with dismissals or demotions; building partnerships with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and other government institutions. From the above mentioned best practices which Rwanda is practicing, this research will try to find out the effectiveness of the anti-corruption strategies which the Malawi Road Traffic Directorate, one of the public institutions devised and rolled out. The present study will relate the type of strategies and the kind of implementation which the Road Traffic follows.

2.6 Anti-corruption strategies implemented in Mozambique

Mozambique's quality of governance is still poor as witnessed by the dropping in the ranking on the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index from 2014 to 2016. In 2014, Mozambique scored 31 percent placing it on position 119 out of 176 countries; in 2015, maintained the same score of 31 percent with a change in the ranking to 111. However, in 2016, Mozambique performed badly by moving several steps from 111 to 145 with a score of 27 percent. Although this is the case Mozambique developed anti-corruption measures in order to fight corruption. For example, in 2001, Mozambique formulated a Public Sector Reform Strategy, which aimed at improving public services and reducing opportunities for corruption (Martini, 2014).

The 2001 strategy introduced a new public management system and within the same strategy, new anti-corruption law was passed. In addition, the anti-corruption agency was strengthened, and research projects were commissioned to evaluate the state of corruption in the country. In 2004, another anti-corruption strategy covering period 2006 to 2010 was devised which among others things aimed at increasing participation of local communities in monitoring the government and encouraging a transparency culture, integrity and responsibility in the public sector. In 2012, Mozambique enacted additional anti-corruption laws referred to as ‘the anti-corruption package’, which included bills regulating criminalization of corruption, immunities, statute of limitation, conflicts of interest, whistle blowing and mutual assistance.

Another measure, which was also put in place, was the ratification of UNCAC in 2008, AUCAC in 2006 and the SADC Protocol (2001). In view of the above, we can see that Mozambique continue to perform badly on governance despite having similar anti-corruption measures with those countries perceived to be doing well on fighting against corruption. Martini (2014) points out that some of the reason why Mozambique is not doing well on corruption fight; despite the government preaching freedom of expression. The first reason Martini (2014) gives is that journalists continue to be reprimanded for reporting issues of corruption. Secondly, Government owns and operates much of the print, radio and television media and few civil society organizations that work in governance anti-corruption. These elements which Mozambique is underutilizing are the same elements which are making other countries to win the fight especially involvement of civil society as the case in Rwanda.

The anti-corruption strategies adopted by Rwanda, however, are not different from the strategies taken by other countries like Mozambique, which are perceived to be the most corrupt. The only difference could be the level of seriousness in the implementation of the strategies. Another reason could be the political will and strong leadership, which lack in some jurisdictions where the leaders themselves are involved in corruption.¹⁸

2.7 Indicators for measuring effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies

Assessing effectiveness of strategies or policies, rules, and other methods is an important step in the other resource management planning process. It helps to determine the need for further action and possible changes and improvements in policy statements and plans, or in actions taken to implement them.¹⁹ There are questions, which need to be answered in order to assess if there is an effectiveness of a strategy such as; is the policy achieving its objective? Are the implementing agencies delivering anticipated outcomes? How effective is the implementation process has been? Does the policy cover most important things? Are there emerging issues that are not being addressed? Preventive measures are equally important in the fight against corruption; however, effective implementation of preventive strategies requires strong regulative framework, capable institutions, mobilization, and participation of the public. It requires a holistic approach and a long-term fundamental change in mind set and culture.

¹⁸ The saga of ex-president of Ukraine (Transparency International 2016).

¹⁹(The RMA Quality Planning Resources accessed at www.qualityplanning.org.nz sourced on 17 July 2017).

The fight against corruption is perceived as a difficult undertaking in which progress is difficult to achieve and to measure. However, there are indicators, which are used to assess or measure the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies implemented in a public institution. These include the following: a shift in social norms and culture, strengthened anti-corruption agencies; frequent conduct of public awareness campaigns on the evils of corruption; strengthened institution of accountability; strengthened partnership with stakeholders who hold the same drive to fight corruption; development of policies aiming at promoting transparency and accountability such as whistle blowing, gift policies, code of conducts, which guide the behaviour of the employees, client service charters to improve service delivery, reduced discretionary powers for simple government tasks such as distribution of licenses and permits (Shah 1999, 2005 in World Bank, 2006). Below is a review of the above stated measurement indicators used to assess if anti-corruption strategies are achieving their objective and assess whether implementation process is being successful.

2.7.1 Shifts in social norms

Social norms are the knowledge, attitudes, values, and behaviours that comprise the normative structure of culture and society (Treisman, 2007). In terms of fighting corruption, the success of anti-corruption strategies can be measured if there is a change in norms or behaviour, thus a change of the culture of paying bribes when one wants speedy services, a culture of giving favours to relatives. The effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies may be measured if people are no longer practicing nepotism or favouritism and opt for merit- based service delivery. This is a practice of

giving favours or preferential treatment to people who are related to the position holders.

2.7.2 Strengthened organizational capacity

Effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies can also be measured if the organizational capacity is strengthened. In this case, Organizational capacity includes a set of the skills, staffing and leadership, organizational structure and systems, finances, and strategic planning (Treisman, 2007). Development of these capacities is critical to advocacy and policy change. The success of anti-corruption strategies can be measured if the institution has taken a step further in appointing members of staff to lead in the implementation of strategies. That leader must be equipped with skills and there must be a separate budget to carry out anti-corruption activities like training and seminars for the employees. UNDP (2009) advocates for integrating anti-corruption strategies in its programmes by supporting anti-corruption institutions such as increasing funding for carrying out anti-corruption activities. UNDP (2009) also focuses on research and planning as one way of integrating anti-corruption measures since causes, consequences and perception of corruption constantly change.

Training is a common element included in most integral systems like anti-corruption programmes. Training on ethical principles and their application is diverse. Some require only new employees to undergo training, while others require regular trainings. Other ethical regimes focus on certain levels of employees such as senior officers or positions that are considered particularly vulnerable e.g. motor vehicle examiners, tax collectors, traffic police officers among others.

2.7.3 Development and enforcement of codes of conduct and other related anti-corruption policies

Success of the Anti-corruption strategies may also be measured if an institution has taken a step further in developing and strictly enforcing a code of conduct and the subsequent anti-corruption policies such as whistle blowing and gift policies. Gilman & Stout (2005) points out that Codes of Conduct and Ethics act as foundation documents that provide the framework, the public service use to carry out their public responsibility, they clearly articulate unacceptable behaviours as well as providing a vision for which government official is striving to achieve. From what Gilman argues, it can be stated that Codes of Conduct play a greater role in changing people's behaviour including the one that can lead them into indulging into corrupt practices. However, for the Codes of Conduct and Ethics to be effective, they must be clear, consistent, and comprehensive and have practical application (Lawton, Rayner & Lasthuizen, 2013). Effectiveness of the Codes of Conduct and Ethics can also be measured if the content of the Codes are disseminated and publicized through workshops and briefings to the employees. The subsequent development of other related policies also matters most to assess if the anti-corruption strategies are being effective.

Policies such as whistle-blowing policy which acts as a tool for fighting corruption has proven to be effective in many parts of the worlds. Ogbu (2017, p. 28) describes whistle blowing as a moral obligation of all committed members of an organization, community or state to expose violations or acts of corruption that are likely to undermine progress or the pursuit of common good. The effectiveness of every whistle blowing policy is hinged on how well it is able to preserve integrity of the

process so that it is never used as a tool for vengeance or undermining. The whistle blowing policy should also put in place measures on how to deal with issues of discrimination and victimization of the whistle blowers. For example, in Nigeria, the whistle-blowing policy was proved to be helpful in uncovering corruption. Within six months since its inception, the Nigerian government was able to recover billions of stolen government funds through tips from whistle blows (Kazeem, 2017). Enforcement of Gift Policy is another indicator, which may be used to measure effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies in an institution. Heathfield (2017) argues that a gift policy provides guidance to employees about what is and what is not appropriate to accept as a present, offering, advertisement, award, or a token of appreciation from a customer, vendor, supplier, potential employee. If gifts are allowed, the gift policy defines the acceptable value and type of gifts permissible to employees. The present study focused on whether the DRTSS has a Code of Conduct, whether or not members of staff are trained on the Code. It also assessed if it developed whistle blowing policy on top of the code of conduct.

2.7.4 Strengthened partnership with other players

There is an existing argument that corruption is a collective action problem which requires collective effort for it to be eliminated. Therefore, anti-corruption strategies are said to be effective if the institution has taken an effort in identifying anti-corruption actors in government as well as appropriate timing for engaging them in the civil society and private sector. Strengthened partnership is another way of measuring effectiveness of an anti-corruption strategy whereby the public institution chooses to work with a number of partners including the anti-corruption agency at different levels and different business components. Curbing corruption is a serious

global challenge; no government can fight corruption alone; there is a need to involve the private sector and civil society. These groups can serve not only as watchdogs for government action, but they can also play a vital role in promoting integrity within their own sphere of influence (UNCAC, 2003, p. 9). Partnerships that draw on the expertise and resources of all partners are essential in the global fight against corruption. A sustained relationship among partners makes their anti-corruption efforts more consistent and helps forge a common fight against corruption (Sullivan, 2012, p. 3). Collaboration amongst activist groups is also needed to avoid duplication of efforts (Transparency International, 2012). Marshall (2011) is also advocating that elimination of corruption is not just a responsibility of the government but of the whole society. This means that government should form partnership with other stakeholders to fight corruption. A good example is South Korea one of the countries that has also registered success on the development scene through eradication of corruption. During its building period, the Korean government pursued an extensive anti-corruption agenda in order to reduce the opportunities of bribery (Tamyalew, 2010). Tamyalew (2010) points out that indicators of assessing effectiveness of Anti-corruption reforms in South Korea was to check if there was strengthened partnership with institutions with the same goal of fighting corruption, public awareness through anti-corruption education, campaigns and research based on voluntary efforts. The effectiveness may be measured if there are increased level of collaboration (coordination) among partners, joint anti-corruption campaigns and increase in number of partners.

2.7.5 Efficient accountability mechanisms

Accountability mechanisms encourage ethical behaviour by making unethical activities hard to commit and easy to detect. Bertok (2004) adds that accountability mechanisms set guidelines for government activities for checking that results have been achieved and for checking that due process has been observed. Some of the accountability mechanisms include internal administrative procedures (requires that activities or requests be recorded in writing), comprehensive processes such as audits, and evaluation of an agency's performance or new forms of procedures such as whistle blowing.

2.7.6 Enhancement of ICT

The enhancement of ICT infrastructure and educating the people on the use of ICT is another indicator of assessing effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies as technology decrease contact between public official and the citizens. It also decreases direct contact between the Public Official and clients thereby decreasing chances of paying bribes.

In summary, it has been analysed that the anti-corruption strategies may be said to be effective if the following indicators are present in an institution. These include the assessment of change in social norms and people's behaviour, strengthened capacity, development and enforcement of Codes of Conduct, which guides people's behaviour, presence of training on corruption and governance issues, development of policies that promote transparency and accountability. Strengthened alliances with actors who are willing to eradicate corruption; increasing funding to carry out anti-corruption

activities and the enhancement of ICT infrastructure educating the people on the use of ICT.

2.8 Challenges that hinder effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies

It is not a secret that implementation of anti-corruption strategies can be done without facing challenges. According to Boehn (2014) survey results, time constraint was identified as one the challenges faced by sectors in implementing anti-corruption measures. Nevertheless, the one with the highest score was lack of internal capacity for designing anti-corruption approaches, sector programmers, staff not usually trained to identify how governance problems or corruption may cause failure to achieve results.

Lack of interest by sector staff, as the staff show some resistance in implementing the changes aimed at integrating anti-corruption measures. The present study presents specific challenges being faced by the DRTSS in implementing the anti-corruption strategies.

UNDP's Strategic plan recognizes anti-corruption as one of the three international principles and crosscutting governance issues to be integrated into all UNDP practices and programme areas. However, the implementation of anti-corruption strategies at the institution level faces several challenges such as lack of awareness, resources and skills of staff on the ground to implement anti-corruption activities. The Boehn (2014) conquers with UNDP views on challenges encountered in the integration of anti-corruption strategies such as lack of capacity for designing anti-corruption measures.

The present study explores the challenges faced by the Road Traffic when implementing anti-corruption.

Injene and Ngahu (2014) identify challenges faced by the Kenyan Anti-Corruption Commission in implementing anti-Corruption measures as inadequate financial capacity, budget constraints and shortage of staff. Lack of a national anti-corruption policy and having a weak legal framework, are some of the contributing factors that hinder the implementation of anti-corruption strategies.

The Department of Ethics and Integrity of Uganda describes some challenges faced in the implementation towards promoting ethics and integrity in the country. Challenges include failing to build a consensus on the meaning of ethics and integrity and on the national values that should guide the country or institution in the fight against corruption. The absence of a nationally agreed set of ethics and integrity values complicates the work of promoting ethics and integrity in the public services (Ugandan Department of Ethics. Having reliable and credible leaders and officers in the public services to champion the process of promoting ethics and integrity and having those leaders who can instil professional discipline in the public service is another challenge. Many public servants do not belong to professional bodies, which are known to be effective in disciplining their members. Another challenge is civic education; thus, building civic competences; ultimately, the successes of integrating ethics and integrity in all sectors in all organization at all levels will depend on the nature of the individuals that graduate from country's schools. The challenge in Uganda is that the education system was nurturing individuals who cherish the agreed national ethics and integrity values. The fight against corruption and efforts to

integrate ethics and integrity in all sectors can only succeed when there is adequate capacity to effectively plan, implement, monitor, and evaluate strategies, programmes, and activities for it. Capacity, in this case, includes individual and team knowledge, skills, and attitudes, institutional structures, processes, procedures, rules and regulations, policy framework and overall governance environment, and the facilities, equipment, logistics and funds. Even though these challenges are faced in Uganda, the present study will try to unearth the challenges that the Malawi Public sector faces in integrating ethics and integrity values.

2.9 Major approaches to fighting against corruption

There are various approaches which countries and institutions employ in order to fight corruption. Below is a review of various but related approaches that countries adopt in order to fight against corruption.

2.9.1 Legal administrative approach

This approach focuses on establishing the rule of law, regulations, administrative reforms, separation of politics and administration, anti-favouritism, whistle blower's protection laws among others in order to reduce corruption (Kim, 2013). According to Kim, this approach has worked in European countries and North America where there is strong abundance of strict laws. It further argued that a more workable approach in the fight against corruption consists of implementation of the anti-corruption laws, auditing and internal control requirements for public and private entities, transparent rules of procurement, freedom-of-information laws and anti-money laundering laws (Heimann and Heinemann, 2006). However, other scholars have argued on the contrary that the best approach to arresting corruption is simply to eliminate laws and

programs that prevent breeding of corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). This is a very common approach whereby various countries whether developed or developing have formulated laws, regulations and anti-corruption agencies to help in the fight against corruption. However, the results from these countries differ despite taking the same approach.

2.9.2 Behavioural-cultural approach

This approach aims at changing human behaviours on corruption by stressing ethics and professional norms, advancing a strong sense of public services ethics and building organizational integrity (Kim, 2013). The formulation of Code of Ethics and Conducts compel public officers to exercise discretion powers to promote public interest. However, having ethically conscious human behaviour and organizational cultures has a long-term impact, which needs more time unlike establishing anti-corruption legal systems.

2.9.3 Economic approach

This approach assumes that humans are a product of economic conditions and the abuse of entrusted power by elected officials and public agents for private gain is curbed as citizens (as principals) and public officials (as agents) become affluent (Kim, 2013). It is further argued that the temptation to pay or receive bribes and express fees or the use of managerial discretion for personal gain and favouritism remarkably declines if public officials are well paid, citizens are better-off and their living standards are higher. This argument is supported by an annual survey of Transparency International (2010) on the general views of corruption and experiences of bribery around the world, which revealed that high-income countries are perceived

to be less corrupt, low-income countries, are perceived to be more corrupt. For example, the same study shows that New Zealand, Denmark, Singapore, Sweden and Switzerland as the least corrupt nations on the globe and they are economically stable too. Therefore, the study concluded that economic freedom, social-political stability and traditional law abidance are major variables that dictate the degree of corruption (Park, 2003, p. 29 as cited in Kim, 2013, p. 387). However, this works well in some other countries but there are some people who wants to accumulate more wealth they can still be tempted to indulge in corruption despite receiving hefty packages as Wandu (2014) has argued that greed is the main reason why people indulge in corrupt acts. Klitgaard (1999, p. 31) describe corruption as an economic crime of calculation. That is, if the probability of being caught is small and the penalty is mild, and the pay offs are large relative to the positive incentives facing the public official, the official will not desist corruption. In this circumstance, the official will capitalize the rewarding part other than the riskier part.

2.9.4 Technological approach

This is another approach that emphasizes on utilizing Information Communication Technology (ICT) in service provision and delivery in order to curb corruption in government. ICT allows citizens to have access to government information and participate in decision-making and services delivery process using modern information technology and social media (Kim, 2013). A case study of the Seoul Metropolitan Government in South Korea revealed that an anti-corruption e-government initiative called Online Procedures, Enhancement for Civil Application, which was launched in 1999, made a positive impact on the reduction of corruption in local government (Kim, Kim, & Lee, 2009). However, the effectiveness of the use of

ICTs as a means of fighting corruption in government depends on educated and civilized human capital and sound technological infrastructure in addition to positive attitude of the public toward ICT (Kim, 2013). The use of ICT as a strategy to curb corruption works in such a way that there is less contact between service providers and their client (Lopez, 2014). In that respect, the internet has been proved an effective tool to reduce corruption (Andersen, Bentzen, Dalgaard & Seyala, 2011). ICT also speed up the process which prevents clients from seeking speedy services by bribing the public service providers who normally public officials. The use of ICT makes monitoring of staff activities by supervisors easier and more effective and in India, the Hydrated Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewage Board made a considerable use of ICT to support institutional reform (Davis, 2004). Although ICT has proved to be efficient in fighting corruption in many countries, there are some countries and institutions where corrupt officials have still found their way to indulge in corruption. A good example is the Malawian cash looting scandal that emerged in 2013 whereby public officials beat the Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS) and siphoned public funds for public gains.

2.9.5 Human rights approach

Corruption indirectly violates human rights as it denies the benefit of fundamental goods, services to persons who are ordinarily entitled to such good, and services (Ramsden, 2016). Corruption negatively affects social-economic rights and hampers right to development. It also directly violates human rights as it violates right to equality and discriminates against individuals (Ramsden, 2016). The human rights approach mainly focuses on the victim rather than the perpetrator. The approach allows one to confront corruption at different levels by building public policies into

the fight against corruption. The people feel empowered if they have access to information and education. Thus, eliminating a culture of secrecy by those in power and replacing it with a culture of transparency and accountability.

All the above approaches aim at enhancing transparency and accountability, which are main ingredients into curbing corruption. As to which approach is more effective in fighting corruption in government depends on the country's situation and thus it would be difficult to develop a model integration of all approaches. For example, a study of e-government in fighting corruption in Greece noted that the introduction of performance monitoring technology does not always ensure accountability in the public sector (Petrakaki, Hayes & Introna, 2009, p. 160, cited in Kim 2013, p. 394).




Figure 2: Conceptual framework.

Source: Bonga (2018).

2.10 Major theories used in the fight against corruption

Despite having several approaches which can be used in the fight corruption. Theories too form the best foundation in devising strategies aimed at fighting corruption. Furthermore, theories serve different purposes in research; for example, in quantitative research they provide a proposed explanation for the relationship among variables being tested whilst in qualitative research, they may serve as lens for the inquiry or they may be generated during the study (Creswell, 2009). Theoretical perspective has been widely used to comprehend the concept of corruption across various disciplines. Some perceive corruption as an individual problem whereby one mainly entrusted to perform public duty misuse the power. Others understand corruption as a collective action problem whereby different players contribute to its occurrence. There are different theories, which different scholars have used to apply anti-corruption measures. In this study, two theories namely the famous Principal-Agent theory and Collective Action theory have been reviewed.

2.10.1 Principal-Agent theory

When people think of fighting corruption, Principal- Agent theory is the one that comes into their mind. Exponents of Principal-Agent Theory argue that corruption is a problem that involves one or more actors either individuals or organizations) called the “agents” who are entrusted with authority to act on behalf of some other individuals, groups or cause called “the principal” (Stephenson,2015). These agents, which in other circumstance include political leaders and public servants, are supposed to act in the interest of the citizenry, who are regarded as principals but due to lack of monitoring by the principal, the agents end up acting in their own best interest. At some point, elected leaders who are responsible for formulating and

initiating public policies do act as principals while bureaucrats whose functions involve implementing these public policies act as agents. In this case, the principal-agent theory relates appropriately to the widely used definition of corruption as provided by the Transparency International, which is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain (Transparency International, 2009).

DFID (2015, p. 15) attributes corruption as a principal-agent problem that exists when one party to a relation(s) (principal) requires a service of another party (agent) but the principal lacks necessary information to monitor the agent's performance in an effective way. The information asymmetry that arises because the agent is advantageous of having better or more information than the principal creates power imbalance between the two and makes difficult for the principal to ensure the agent's compliance (Booth, 2012 as cited by DFID, 2015, p. 15) and Klitgaard, 1988). According to this theory, corruption only occurs when the principal is unable to monitor the agent effectively and the agent betrays the principal's interests. In this understanding, corruption is said to be an agent action which occur to suit his or her interest. A good example are public servants or elected officials who may take advantage of their power or lack of knowledge by the citizens and abuse their public office to secure public rents in exchange of public services. Another scenario is when elected officials who may be principals themselves may have difficulties in ensuring adequate oversight over the behaviour and actions of civil servants (the agents) who may engage in acts of corruption that the elected officials cannot control (Marquette and Peiffer, 2015).

In view of the above, the principal agent theory is not only appropriate in the fight against public sector corruption but also essentially relevant to the study of integrating anti-corruption measures at a public institution. Since administrative corruption takes place at the institutional level by the policy implementers; therefore, in order to deal with corruption, the principal should negatively affect the agent's motivation to engage in corrupt behaviour. This may be done through control instruments that decrease the level of discretion among agents and increase the level of accountability in the system (Klitgaard, 1988, p.27). UNDP (2009) further adds that discretion for public officials could be reduced through privatization, deregulation and meritocratic recruitment. It is further argued that monopoly can be reduced by promoting political and economic competition; increasing accountability by supporting democratization and increased public awareness, encourage greater transparency of government decision making through deepening decentralization, increased public oversight through parliament, an independent media as well as through creation and encouragement of civil society watchdogs (Transparency International 2000, UNDP 2004 and World Bank, 2000 as cited in Persson, Rothstein, & Theorell, 2013, p. 453).

Principal-Agent theory can be very useful in the fight against corruption as the target could be to empower principals with much information so that they monitor the conduct of the agent in order to prevent them from engaging in corruption. Principal-Agent theory has been a well-established theory that has been adopted in order to understand type of corruption that exists at an institution and their common causes (Klitgaard, 1988). This theory is also relevant to use it in formulating anti-corruption strategies that could prevent the agent from engaging in corruption. Thus, basing on the behavioural and economic approach, an initiative could be developed to change

the agent's behaviour by enforcing Code of Conducts and make sure that he or she is economically empowered. The theory is also important to be used in understanding challenges faced during implementation of anti-corruption strategies. A good example is that, there are some challenges which emerge due to the existence of the principal agent relationship. The agent may become resistance to new measures aimed at addressing corruption because of the benefits they get from the old ways of running the institution. Although this is the case, several analysts have noted that the principal-agent theory on its own is not enough in fighting corruption because sometimes there is an absence of stakeholders willing to act as principals to enforce existing laws and policies (Amundsen, 2006; Johnston, 2005; Kpundey, 1998; &2004; Riley,1998; Robinson, 1998, &World Bank, 1994 as cited in Persson, Rothstein & Theorell,2013, p. 454). Political leaders as well as citizens seem to passively maintain the corrupt system. For example, citizens in their individual encounter with public officials, majority in the end still seem to perpetuate rather than fight corrupt exchanges even though not as actively as political leaders whose corrupt scandals have emerged (Pearson, A, Rothstein, B & Theorell 2013, p. 455). Due to this theory's weaknesses, probably, there is need to look for another theory which can be essential and complement it.

Considering the above arguments which are in favour of Principal-Agent theory, then it can be assumed that corruption is only done by a certain group of individual mandated to perform duties on behalf of the other group; however, that is not the case because even the group which is being referred to as principals, may be unable to monitor the acts of the civil servants because themselves are benefiting from those acts. Furthermore, the citizens who may be referred to as principals in other cases may

be unable to hold the public servants accountable because they are the ones fuelling corruption especially having reviewed earlier that social cultural norms contribute to corruption. With the above arguments, the Principal-Agent theory fails to consider that in environments where corruption is deeply rooted, there may be lack of principled principals (DFID 2015, p. 16), hence the need for another theory to complement the former.

2.10.2 Collective Action theory

Marquette and Peiffer (2015) argue that wide-scale failure of anti-corruption programmes lies in the inappropriate theoretical foundations that underscore their design. He further argues that most anti-corruption programming is overwhelmingly influenced by the Principal –Agent theory above which depicts corruption as occurring when public officials who have discretion over the provision of public services lack accountability. When applied to anti-corruption, this lens emphasizes the rational choice that takes place in individual incidences of corruption, implicitly assuming that corruption is ‘solvable’ with policies that can alter these individual calculations. Different critics have recently advanced their arguments that the above assumption is flawed especially in systematically corrupt contexts where corruption is best understood to be a collective action problem instead (Persson, Rothstein & Teorell 2013; Mungiu- Pippidi, 2011 as cited in Marquette and Peiffer, 2015; Rothstein, 2011).

Collective Action Theory is another important theory employed in the fight against corruption. The Collective Action lens applied to corruption emphasizes the fact that some individual decisions on whether or not to engage in corruption occur within a

wider society rather than in isolation of the behaviour of others (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015). Persson, Rothstein and Theorell (2010) have criticized the Principal-Agent view within anti-corruption policy as well as governance. They advocate that corruption should be viewed as a collective action problem whereby everybody is believed to be involved in corruption as there are few incentives for individuals to abstain from corruption. In this theory, each stakeholder should have their own collective action strategy. This is the engagement of other stakeholder who hold the same goal of seeking to address corruption such as enforcement agencies, civil society, government-policy makers, and private sector. Active involvement of these stakeholders will help to enforce and enhance better anti-corruption compliance programmes, enhance good network of contacts with the local stakeholders respectively (Story, 2016). Effective anti-corruption initiatives need to recognize and engage with the real political dynamics that underpin corruption as well as to address the perception that corruption is normal when it exists.

In view of the above, concentrating on the agent as the only perpetrator of corruption then a point will be missed in dealing with the scourge. Mostly, corruption happens in circumstances where there are mutual benefits for both parties such that focusing on one side then the scourge cannot be eliminated. This is where Collective Action Theory becomes more relevant in the corruption fight compared to the widespread Principal-Agent theory. Therefore, Ostom (1998), Rothstein (2011a) and Theorell (2007) agree that the implementation of anti-corruption measures turns into a collective action problem (Pearson, A, Rothstein, B & Theorell 2013, P. 464). As such the conceptualization of systemic corruption as a collective action rather than a principal-agent action has significant policy implication. This is evidenced by the

approach taken by the countries considered to be the least corrupt thus Hong Kong and Singapore; corruption was successfully fought from “above” implying that the member of the ruling elite themselves set an example by changing their behaviour beyond the rhetorical level (Root 1996 as cited in Pearson, A, Rothstein, B & Theorell, 2013). Therefore, collective action theory is a good theory which can be useful when formulating anti-corruption strategies. In the present study, concentrating on a single theory like the Principal Agent Theory can lead to missing out of a fact that corruption should be viewed as a collective action problem, whereby everybody is believed to be involved in corruption (Persson, Rothstein and Theorell, 2010). In the present study, Collective Action theory will also assist in assessing the effectiveness of some anti-corruption strategies. In this case, the assessment would not only focus on the change in norms and behaviour on a single stakeholder but others too who are believed to also initiate corruption.

Having looked at different types of corruption and probably the factors that trigger corruption in the previous chapters, it has been observed that there are some causes or types of corruption that target an individual in this case a public official and some causes emanate from different players. Therefore, to properly assess the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies at the institution it is proper to combine both Principal-Agent theory and the Collective Action theory as they are both relevant in the fight against corruption. From the literature, it has been understood that corruption is multifaceted problem; furthermore, corruption erupt due to different factors. It is therefore justified to use different theories in order to understand the phenomenon.




Figure 3: Theoretical framework for the study.

Source: Bonga (2018).

2.11 Chapter summary

The chapter has critically analysed the concept of corruption, types of corruption, reviewed literature on the causes of corruption. It has also reviewed some anti-corruption strategies being implemented in some Sub-Saharan African countries. It has further reviewed different authors' views on the effectiveness of the anti-corruption strategies, the challenges usually faced in the implementation of these strategies, approaches employed in the fight against corruption. From the literature, both conceptual and theoretical framework have been drawn which will be applied in the present study.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

Having reviewed literature related to the topic of research in the preceding chapter, the researcher employed mixed research method in order to collect and analyse data. Therefore, this chapter presents the research design, which entails whether the data was qualitative or quantitative or a combination of both. The chapter further presents the kind of population from which the research took place; sampling methods, method used to collect data, ethical application during the study and data analysis.

3.2 Research design

Research design is referred to as plans and procedures for research that spans the decisions from broad assumption to detailed methods of data collection and analysis (Creswell, 2009, p. 3). Selecting a research design is one of the most important initial steps with which the researcher needs to undertake before embarking on the actual research.

In the study, the researcher employed a mixed approach to conducting the research. This involved combining both qualitative and quantitative studies to achieve the specific objectives. Research design is more than simply collecting, and analysing both kinds of data; it involves the use of both approaches in tandem so that the overall

strength of a study is greater than either qualitative or quantitative research (Creswell & Clark, 2007 as cited in Creswell, 2009, p. 4).

The qualitative data gives strengths to the quantitative data as it provides explanation to the views or justification why a person holds the given perception towards a concept. Specifically, the study employed a convergent parallel mixed method design where both qualitative and quantitative data is collected and analysed at the same time or in a single phase (Cresswell and Clark, 2011).

3.2.1 *Qualitative research design*

This is a means of exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem (Cresswell, 2009, p. 4). A good example is when trying to understand why corruption is still rampant in a public institution despite devising strategies aimed at combating it. In this study, qualitative research was employed in order to understand how the respondents understand by the terms: corruption; anti-corruption strategies that the DRTSS is implementing and challenges faced in the implementation of the anti-corruption measures at the DRTSS.

Under this type of research, data was collected through in-depth interviews with three key informants from the Anti-Corruption Bureau who were desk officers for anti-corruption programmes and activities at the DRTSS and one key informant from the DRTSS.

In-Depth interviewing is a qualitative research technique that involves conducting intensive individual interviews with a small number of respondents to explore their

perspectives on a particular idea, programme, or situation (Boyce & Neale, 2006, p. 3). The key informants explained the concept of corruption which included the definition, various forms and types/ categories of corruption that are common at DRTSS. They also provided detailed information on the strategies being implemented at DRTSS, how effective are the strategies in fighting corruption. They went further to explain in great detail the challenges the DRTSS was facing during implementation of anti-corruption strategies. Another extensive interview was undertaken with a seasoned investigative journalist specialising on unearthing issues of corruption in public institutions. The journalist highlighted some the anti-corruption strategies at the DRTSS which are effective and challenges the DRTSS was facing in dealing away with corruption. The journalist provided his opinion on whether or not corruption was being contained at the DRTSS. Some information was obtained from a Traffic Police Officer and MRA officer who opted for anonymity to complement the findings.

3.2.2 Quantitative research design

This is a means for testing objective theory by examining the relationship between variables (Creswell, 2009). These variables in turn are typically measured on instruments, so that numbered data can be analysed using statistical procedures like Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). In this research, the quantitative research design assisted in obtaining perception from the Road Traffic clients on whether they understood the term corruption, its various forms and categories. To obtain this data the clients were also asked to state how strongly agree or disagree were the causes of corruption and to rate the prevalence of corruption and by stating whether corruption was being contained at DRTSS. The study went further to rate the opinion of employees as to what could be the causes of corruption at the DRTSS. It

further collected data from the employees as to what anti-corruption strategies being implemented at the DRTSS and challenges being faced by the DRTSS when implementing various anti-corruption strategies.

The present research is a case study, which entails detailed and intensive analysis of a single case (Bryman, 2008). Case study research is concerned with the complexity and nature of the case in question (Stake 1995 as cited in Bryman, 2008). Banerjee et al. (2011 as cited in Hanna, Bishop, Nadel, Scheffler & Durlacher, 2011, p. 25) outlines the history of the methodologies that have been used for measuring corruption including the use of qualitative data and case studies to describe specific channels of corruption and the use of perception-based studies to produce cross time datasets. The present study aimed at focusing on a single public institution, which is the DRTSS. However, instead of employing a single design, it employed a mixed method approach in order to strengthen the findings.

3.3 Population and sample size

The study was conducted at the DRTSS, as a follow up on studies done by the Centre for Social Research in 2005 and 2010 and 2013, previous local newspapers' reports and previous years' research studies by Afro Barometer that indicated that corruption at the DRTSS had become rampant. The DRTSS's head office is situated in Lilongwe and has a number of operational offices namely Blantyre, Zomba, Lilongwe, Mangochi, Balaka Weighbridge, Songwe Weighbridge, Mangochi and Mzuzu. The plan was to compare results between Blantyre and Zomba in terms of trend in corruption but due to the challenges which the researcher faced at Blantyre DRTSS office; the research failed to compare the results of the two offices. To strengthen the

results, the research involved interviewing one key informant from the DRTSS, three key informants from the ACB thus from Mzuzu, Zomba and Blantyre, one investigative journalist, an anonymous MRA Officer and one Traffic Police Officer, twenty-five (25) DRTSS clients against a target of thirty (30) clients from Zomba and twenty-Seven (27) against a target of thirty (30) from Blantyre.

A sample is a set of elements taken from a larger population; whereas sampling is a process of selecting representative number of elements from a population (Edriss, 2003, p. 35). Sampling is important because it assists the researcher to get quality data unlike collecting data from the entire population. To collect qualitative data, the researcher used purposive sampling method whereby in-depth interviews were conducted with three key informants from the ACB (Desk Officers responsible for coordinating anti-corruption programmes at the DRTSS) and one from the DRTSS. Purposive sampling, which is a type of non-probability sampling method works well with a small sample focusing on research participants who have knowledge on the topic (Saunders et al, 2009). In this research, the above-mentioned three key informants had knowledge of the anti-corruption strategies, their effectiveness and challenges being faced when implementing the strategies at the DRTSS. The DRTSS key informant was knowledgeable because he is responsible for coordinating anti-corruption activities at the DRTSS.

Systematic random sampling which is a probability type of sampling method was also employed to collect data from the employees. In systematic random sampling, only the first unit is selected randomly, and the remaining units are selected at fixed intervals. This sampling method is preferred because it is easier and less costly

method of sampling and can be conveniently used even in cases of large populations (Kothari 2004, p.62). Since DRTSS did not have a comprehensive list of employees which contained names of all employees; therefore, the names of employees had to be obtained from Zomba DRTSS Office. The researcher failed to obtain a list from Blantyre as the Controlling Officer at the Regional office denied the researcher access to the institution. He gave the reason that he would only accept if the research was covering all DRTSS Offices in the country. With this kind of sampling, the researcher selected one third of the population from the sample frame. Zomba had a total of Twenty- three (23) officials and a sample of eight (8) officials were selected; however, due to sensitivity of the topic of research, only six (6) out of eight (8) officials accepted to be interviewed by the researcher representing 75% response rate. Some respondents gave excuses that they were sick, while others said they were busy serving clients.

In order to collect quantitative data from the DRTSS clients on the corruption perception at DRTSS, the researcher used convenience sampling, as administration of the questionnaire depended on the willingness and availability of the participants (Bryman, 2008) due to sensitivity of the matter. Convenience sampling is mostly used when it represents the opportunity, which is too good to miss. However, the data did not allow definitive findings to be generated because of the problem of generalization (Bryman, 2008, p. 183). Fifty-two (52) DRTSS clients were interviewed against a target of sixty (60) respondents. A total of Twenty-five (25) respondents self-administered the questionnaire in Zomba against a target of Thirty (30) respondents representing 83.3% response rate. The research targeted those people who own cars. This was on assumption that they must have visited DRTSS offices at some point.

Some were interviewed right there at the DRTSS premises while other were interviewed outside DRTSS premises. A total of twenty-seven (27) out of thirty (30) respondents self-administered the questionnaire representing 90% response rate.

3.4 Data collection methods

Case Studies tend to be primarily associated with qualitative research, but such an identification is not always proper (Bryman, 2008). Bryman (2008) further argues that advocates of the case study design often favour qualitative research such as participant observation and unstructured interviewing because these methods are viewed as particularly important in the generation of an intensive, detailed examination of the case. On the contrary, case study designs are a home of quantitative research too; recognizing that both methods have limitations, researchers feel that biases inherent in many single methods could neutralize or cancel the biases of the other method (Creswell, 2009, p. 14). Therefore, a mixed method is ideal for case studies. Specifically, debates have been put forward advocating that effectiveness or impact of policies and plans can be measured by perceptions and satisfaction surveys (Q&P, 2013 and Tamyalew, 2010). Therefore, the present study used a mixed of semi-structured and structured questionnaires to interview one third of DRTSS employees in Zomba. The study also involved administering structured questionnaires to fifty-two (52) out of sixty (60) DRTSS clients. The reasons for collecting data from the different sources is that employee surveys are effective way to determine if management has effective implementation of Codes of Conduct (Gilman,2004); furthermore, surveys of the clientele of civil services agencies can shed light on integrity issues as well. The 1999 civil service report card survey in Bangalore, India is an example of a client survey aimed at assessing integrity. An important result of

this survey was an indication of an increase in perceived corruption as evidenced by the growth in both the numbers of respondents who paid bribes and the amounts they paid.²⁰

The sample size was chosen because of its manageability and cost effectiveness; however, the researcher used this sample size while being fully aware that the larger the sample size, the lower the likely error in generalizing to the population (Saunders et al., 2009). Creswell (2003) also noted that qualitative research uses multiple procedures to collect data that are interactive and humanistic. In view of Creswell's argument, the study used interview guides, which contained open-ended questions for conducting in-depth interview with the three key informants, one from the ACB (Desk Officer for DRTSS), DRTSS Officer, journalist, Traffic Police Officer and the MRA officer.

Participant observation is another method that the researcher used to collect qualitative data whereby the researcher engaged a broker popularly known as '*dobadoba*' to process a Certificate of Fitness(COF) for her vehicle without the vehicle being officially tested in Blantyre. On the same day, the researcher went to Zomba DRTSS office to process another Certificate of Fitness for the same vehicle. The reason for doing this was to compare the experiences of the two offices. Bryman (2008), points out the advantage of engaging participant observation is that the researcher's immersion in social setting makes him or her better equipped to see as others see. The participant observer is much closer to the subjects and participates in many kinds of activities as members of social setting being studied (Bryman, 2008).

²⁰<http://www.Transparency.org.au/documents/QNISAreport>

The reason for obtaining data from different kinds of sources and using different kinds of methods is that corruption does not happen with one individual, it is a collective action problem where a number of stakeholders are involved and to strengthen the results of the study respectively. The study also involved analysing relevant documentation both at the DRTSS and at the ACB on strategies being implemented. The study specifically involved analysing corruption related policies, legislations, programmes. Collecting and analysing secondary data proved to be critical because it is a useful source of information from which to answer or partially to answer research questions (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009).

3.4.1 Questionnaire

The research used a self-administered questionnaire which contained both structured and semi structured questions to interview 52 DRTSS clients in Blantyre and Zomba in the southern part of Malawi; thus 25 respondents in Zomba and another 27 respondents in Blantyre. Another questionnaire which also comprised both open ended and closed questions was also administered to one third of DRTSS employees in Zomba. The researcher failed to interview members of staff in Blantyre as she was denied access despite giving her permission by the head office. The questionnaires were delivered in person to respondents who answered the questions (see Appendix I); however, some respondents preferred the researcher to write the answers on their behalf. The reason for using self-administered questionnaire is that it can be administered to a large number of respondents within a short period of time (Cohen and Marion 1983 and Bryman 2008, p. 217) and requires the respondents to respond questions anonymously which provides room for flexibility. Bryman (2008) points out a setback of using self-administered questionnaire which is low response rate and

that there is no probing of the respondents. Bryman (2008), points out that probing is important when open ended questions are asked. In this case however, this problem was dealt with by following in person to all those who were given the questionnaires. The questions comprised a section which collected biodata and the other sections contained anti-corruption strategies related questions. The respondents were asked to give responses like yes or no or not sure questions. They were also asked to give their views from strongly disagree to strongly agree and to rate their opinion from very low to very high.

3.4.2 Interview guide

Another instrument which was used to collect data was an interview guide. This was essential when conducting in-depth interviews with the key informant at ACB and Road Traffic. The interview guide contained open ended questions. Open ended questions allow respondents to answer questions in their own terms as they are not forced to answer in the same terms as those imposed on them by the response choices (Bryman, 2008, p. 232). They are also useful in exploring new areas or ones in which the researcher has limited knowledge (Bryman, 2008, p. 232). The disadvantage is that the questions are time consuming (Bryman, 2008, p. 232) as the respondent can sometimes divert from the main issues.

Table 1: Summary of Methodology

Specific Objective	Sampling Method	Type of Data	Participants	Sample Size	Reasons for the selection
To analyse the corruption phenomenon	Systematic and purposive Sampling Convenient Sampling	Qualitative data quantitative data	Employees and ACB key informants Road Traffic Clients	One third of employees and 2 ACB key informants 52 respondents	To know if they understand what corruption is.
To investigate causes of corruption at Road Traffic	Systematic sampling method. Convenience sampling Purposive sampling	Quantitative data. Qualitative data	Road Traffic Officers Road Traffic clients Key informants	One third of employees One third Four key informants	To test the variables already identified in the literature. To find out what causes corruption
To analyse anti-corruption strategies at the Road Traffic	Purposive sampling	Qualitative data	ACB Desk Officers	three (3)	The key informants have knowledge of the strategies being implemented at the Road Traffic.
Specific Objective	Sampling Method	Type of Data	Participants	Sample Size	Reasons for the selection
To examine effectiveness of the anti-corruption being implemented	Systematic Random sampling method. Purposive Sampling	To obtain quantitative data	Road Traffic Officers. ACB key informants	One third of officers. Three officers	The staff return was used as sample frame. They have knowledge of how effective are the anti-

at Road Traffic	Convenience Sampling		Road Traffic clients.	52 Road Traffic Users.	corruption strategies Availability and willingness of the participants due to lack of sample frame and sensitivity of the topic of research. To appreciate what the agents facilitate corruption.
	Participant Observation	To obtain qualitative data	The researcher	one	The` researcher used her own vehicle to obtain a Certificate of Fitness as it was also due for renewal
To find out the challenges being faced by Road Traffic	Purposive sampling	Qualitative data	ACB Desk Officers	Three (3)	Have knowledge of the challenges being faced in the implementation of the anti-corruption strategies.

3.5 Data analysis

Data analysis is the application of logic and reasoning to refine the collected data (Zikmund, Babin, & Griffin, 2010). The research used both quantitative and qualitative data analysis techniques. Quantitative data was analysed using Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) and Excel. To come up with frequency tables and charts respectively, qualitative data was analysed by identifying themes and categories which formed the patterns.

The discussion of the findings was presented according to the generated themes identified and relates to the literature studies.

3.6 Ethical Consideration

The researcher was aware that in Social Science research, many ethical issues arise during the data collection period since it involves collection of data from people and about people (Punch 2005 in Creswell 2009, p. 87); as such it is important to put them into consideration. In view of the above, permission was sought from Road Traffic and ACB to conduct research in their respective institutions. Due to sensitivity of the matter, the questionnaires were answered anonymously whereby names were not revealed. Among others, the researcher respected the privacy of participants by interviewing some of them in private places, away from their offices. The researcher explained to the participants the purpose of the study in order for the participants to make an informed decision on whether to participate or not. On the same note, the participants were informed well in advance that the participation was voluntary such that they were free to withdraw before or during the interview. In adherence to this, some of the respondents, especially Blantyre DRTSS employees refused to be interviewed. In order to overcome the latter challenge, the researcher widened the scope by increasing the number of key interviewees from other relevant institutions such as the media, MRA and Police.

3.7 Chapter summary

The chapter has presented the research methodology which covers the design of the research. The study adopted the mixed approach whereby both qualitative and quantitative data was collected and analysed. The chapter also presented the population from which the research was conducted. The focus was on the two DRTSS offices namely Blantyre and Zomba of the four main offices namely: Zomba, Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu. The study isolated the two DRTSS offices out of

four because Blantyre represented a bigger office just like Lilongwe while Zomba represented Mzuzu which is equally small office. The chapter has also provided for the sampling method used in the research such systematic random sampling, purposive random sampling and convenience sampling. The methods which were used to collect data were self-administered questionnaires, in-depth interviews with key informants, participant observation and analysis of related documentation. Finally, issues of ethics during the entire research were given great consideration as the research involved interacting with people.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Introduction

The chapter presents the research findings and analysis of the concept of corruption, its causes, anti-corruption strategies being implemented at DRTSS, effectiveness of those strategies and the challenges faced by the DRTSS during implementation of the strategies. The chapter has been structured in such a way that each objective has been tackled separately which involves presenting the findings followed by analysis with available literature.

4.2 Socio-economic profile of respondents

Demographic information provides data regarding research participants. This information is necessary for the determination of whether the individuals in that particular study are representative sample of the target population for generalisation purposes (Salkind, 2010). In this study, it was important to know the gender of the participants for both DRTSS officials and clients in order to know which sex dominate the DRTSS. It was also important to better understand how many times a particular client had been going to DRTSS in order to determine their experience.

4.2.1 Sex and background of respondents

Section A of the DRTSS clients' questionnaire sought demographic information from the respondents requiring them to indicate their sex and the number of years they had

been visiting the DRTSS. This information is important because it allows the researcher to know the kind of the research participants.

A total of fifty-two (52) respondents responded to a self-administered questionnaire and a majority of the clients who participated in the study were male with 66 percentages (%). This implies that mostly, it is men who visit the DRTSS seeking different services as compared to women. On the number of years, being a client with DRTSS there was an average of 6 years and a median 4.5 years.

Similarly, one third of Zomba DRTSS positively responded to the questionnaire. 75% of members of staff who participated in the survey were male, which also implies that DRTSS is dominated by male employees. The study further showed that most members of staff had worked for over five years, 50% of participants had worked for six years 38% of them had worked for ten years, 20% of participants had worked for four years and 12% participants had worked for two years. The staff who participated in the study had different job descriptions such as messengers, systems analysts, accountants, data clerks, and security officer.

4.2.2 Services sought at DRTSS

The study also took time to understand the types of services that are commonly sought from the DRTSS.




Figure 4: Service Sought at DRTSS.

Source: Bonga (2018).

Results from Figure 4 above shows that majority of the respondents were at DRTSS either to renew or acquire a Certificate of Fitness (COF) (48%). 18% of the clients were there to register their vehicles while 14% went to acquire or renew Driving Licenses and 12% were there to change ownership of a vehicle; while the least respondents (8%) were looking for DRTSS Registration Cards. The results show that many people visit the DRTSS to process COFs as it is mandatory to have a vehicle tested for its fitness annually. Vehicle registration is second in line as it is also mandatory for every vehicle to be registered before operating on the roads of Malawi. On the other hand, driving license is renewed after every five years that is why it had a slightly lower percentage on service sought. Card Registration had the lowest percentage of all because it is a once off service.

4.2.3 Number of times clients had been at Road Traffic seeking services

Respondents were further asked to indicate number of times they had gone to Road Traffic seeking services since 2014. This is important to know in order to determine their experience at the DRTSS.

The results indicated that majority of the respondents (68%) had been at DRTSS offices more than once, while 20% had been there once. Interestingly, other respondents responded that they were not sure (10%) while others stated that they had never been there (2%). It is interesting to note that there are some who had indicated that they had never gone to DRTSS yet they own vehicles. It is a requirement that every owner of the vehicle should go and obtain the services or his proxy (DRTSS Key Informant). Probably they send their proxies or they engage brokers to obtain the services.

4.3 The concept of corruption

Analysing the concept of corruption was one of the objectives of the research. Understanding the conception of corruption is a first step to understand the effectiveness of strategies aiming at fighting corruption. In order to achieve this objective, the researcher tried to find out how the term corruption is understood by various respondents. The clients were asked to confirm whether or not they knew what corruption is by choosing yes or no as a response. The key informants and the employees were asked to define what corruption is. As another way of trying to understand this concept, the researcher also managed to find out various forms and categories or types of corruption specifically those common at the DRTSS. The key informants were asked to mention the categories of corruption whereas the employees

and clients were asked to choose from a list of categories provided in the questionnaire.

4.3.1 Meaning of corruption

The study involved asking DRTSS clients whether or not they knew what corruption is by giving a yes or no response.




Figure 5: Understanding Meaning of Corruption, Source: Bonga (2018).

Summary from Figure 5 shows that 71.43% of the respondents responded affirmatively that they knew what corruption is. The figure further indicates that 20.41% do not understand the meaning of corruption, while 8.16% were not sure.

The results therefore give a picture that more clients have knowledge of what corruption is. On the other hand, members of staff were asked to define the term corruption. ACB Respondent from Mzuzu defined the term corruption “as the abuse of official position of a DRTSS officer for private gain.” Respondent from DRTSS said “it is misuse of resources of government for personal gain.” This is the same meaning which the two key informants from Blantyre and Zomba ACB office

provided. The results agree with Schultz & Harutyunyan (2015), Johnston (2005), Transparency International (1999), Luo (2005) and World Bank (2006)'s definitions. They all define corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. On the other hand, Khan (1996) defines it as an act that deviates from the formal rules of conduct governing actions of a person holding a position in public authority because of private-regarding motive such as wealth, power or status. The similarity in the definitions between the above ACB key informants and the employees indicates that the employees might have learnt this definition through sensitization which ACB holds in conjunction with the DRTSS. The difference in the definitions between the research findings and what other writers provides also confirms the general consensus which is available that there is no single definition of corruption.

4.3.2 Forms of corruption

The common forms of corruption at DRTSS included bribery, fraud, embezzlement, extortion, theft, nepotism, favouritism, misuse of public resources and conflict of interest. 75% of employees at Zomba Road Traffic pointed out bribery as the most common form of corruption while 50% of them pointed extortion as the form of corruption that is common at DRTSS. The two key informants at the ACB offices in Mzuzu and Zomba mentioned bribery, extortion, influence peddling, nepotism and favouritism as common forms of corruption at DRTSS. The key informants from ACB gave explanation to some of the common form of corruption as follows: influence peddling was described by one key informant from Mzuzu ACB office as *“where people use connection they have to influence a public officer to perform duties for personal gain”* and the other one from Zomba described it as *“forcing a public officer to perform a public duty for their personal benefit.”* The Corrupt Practices Act (CPA) 1995 as amended in (2004) and UNDP (2007) does not define what influence

peddling is but describes it as one of the corrupt acts. The second key informant gave an example of a politician who visits DRTSS and uses his political influence to get preferential treatment. Thus, they always make sure that they use their official position in order to get quick services

Extortion

The key informants and the clients confirmed the existence of extortion at Road Traffic. The informant from Mzuzu defined it as *“a situation in which an officer puts a client at bay while looking for services; for example, portraying a process as difficult and cumbersome.”* This definition concurs with Morris (2011), who says that extortion occurs when the public official threatens to use (or abuse) state power to induce the payment of a bribe. However, Banik (2010) and the Oxford Dictionary define extortion as the practice of obtaining something through the use of force, threats or violence. Although extortion involves force or violence, in some circumstances, it does not involve violence. Sometimes extortion is possible by just putting a client at bay or threatening to withhold a service unless a bribe is paid. In this case, the client is forced to pay a bribe for a service which is too important to give up. According to the informant’s definition, the type of extortion that exists at Road Traffic does not involve violence but threats of not getting the service in time. Below are the findings from the clients’ view on the existence of extortion at Road Traffic:




Figure 6: Extortion, Source: Bonga (2018).

The study asked clients if they had ever been forced or threatened to pay a bribe to a DRTSS Officer apart from the designated fees in order to get service(s). Results from Figure 6 above reveal that only 36% of the respondents confirmed having been forced to pay a bribe in order to get a service. On the other hand, 62% indicated that they had never been forced to pay any extra money apart from the designated fees; only 2 % were not sure. The percentage might be low probably because the act of corruption usually takes place in private such that people would not want to come out in the open that they were involved in corruption.




Figure 7: Services that attracted extortion, Source: Bonga (2018).

Interestingly, the respondents who were forced to pay a bribe were looking for COF (84%), Driving License (28%), DRTSS Registration Card (4%) and change of motor vehicle ownership services (4%). According to the explanation by the Mzuzu based ACB key informant:

“People are forced to pay the illegitimate money because the process is long as it involves examining fitness of the vehicles. Therefore, sometimes the owners fear that their vehicles will not pass the test.”

The key informant gave an instance whereby motor vehicle examiners delay deliberately so that motor vehicle owners should spend a lot of time waiting for motor examiners at the car examination bay. Therefore, they feel that when they pay money they would bypass all the processes, hence getting quicker services. Another reason could be that COF is a service that is obtained annually as already pointed out as such there is a high probability of attracting corrupt acts.

Bribery

Bribery was described by the two key informants from the ACB as “receipt of gratification in order to perform or for performing official duties for personal gain.”

The key informants’ definition is similar to Johnston (2005, p. 18) definition of bribery that says

“It is an illegal payment made to a government official in return for some type of official, state-sanctioned duty and that in the absence of that secret payment otherwise would have been made.”

These definitions paint a picture that bribery only happens when a public official is involved. However, this is not the case because bribery can also take place in the private sector.




Figure 8: Showing clients’ response on payment of bribery, Source: Bonga (2018).

The study asked clients if they had once paid a bribe to a DRTSS Officer apart from the designated fees. Results from Figure 8above reveal that 44% of the respondents once paid a bribe on free will while 56% indicated that they had never paid a bribe at

all. The results might be emanating from a premise that no one wants to come out in the open that they paid a bribe in order to obtain a service and that is why there is a small percentage of those who confirmed having paid a bribe.




Figure 9: Clients' response on the services for which they paid a bribe. Source: Bonga (2018).

Interestingly, the respondents who had once paid a bribe were looking for COFs (64%), Driving License (24%), and change of motor vehicle ownership services (8%) (Refer to Figure 9). The results revealed that a small number (4%) of clients paid bribes to obtain DRTSS registration card as compared to other services because it is a once off service.

Brokerage (Use of brokers or Dobadoba)

Jancsics (2014) points out that corruption exchanges are often brokered by a third party and admits that this phenomenon has not been satisfactorily explored by researchers of corruption. Brokerage is a form of corruption present at DRTSS and was confirmed by the clients, members of staff and the key informants.

The study found out that there are some brokers who offer to assist clients to obtain services particularly at Blantyre DRTSS office. The brokers charge a fee between Fifteen Thousand Kwacha (MK15,000.00) and Thirty Thousand Kwacha (MK30,000.00) per service. These brokers obtain services on behalf of clients in an easy way.²¹ The study asked clients if they had once engaged a broker or a public official relative when seeking services at Road Traffic.




Figure 10: Showing clients assisted by broker (dobadoba).

Source: Bonga (2018).

²¹ Researchers participant observation

Results from Figure 10 reveals that 48% of the respondents who admitted on having practiced corruption had once engaged a broker to obtain a service on their behalf. On the other hand, 52% indicated that they had never been assisted by a broker. The results show that very few clients engaged a broker, the reason could be that people would not want to come out openly that they were involved in corruption in one way or another.

Below is a bar chart showing services which clients said they were assisted by a broker and/or a relative.




Figure 11: Showing services which client were assisted by a broker.

Source: Bonga (2018).

Furthermore, the respondents who were once been assisted were looking for COFs (58.62%), Driving License (24.14%), change of motor vehicle ownership (10.34%), and DRTSS Registration Card services (8.9%) (See figure 11 above). From the figure above, the results show the same pattern whereas COF is topping the list as an area where much corruption is taking place. Motor vehicle examination is deemed to be one of the longest processes that take place at the DRTSS. The reasons could be clients always want to bypass the process which involves even examining road worthiness of the vehicles.




Figure 12: Showing whether services were genuine or not, Source: Bonga (2018).

The study aimed at finding out if the services which were obtained through a *dobadoba* were genuine or not. In this case, genuine meant whether the documentation was fake or not. On one hand, the results showed that 14% of the respondents said that the services they got through *dobadoba* were not genuine while 86% of the respondents confirmed that the services they got through *dobadoba* were

genuine. In an interview with one Traffic Police Officer, it was established that sometimes they intercept vehicles bearing fake COFs. He, however, did not confirm having intercepted fake driving licences. In order to get more information on this, the researcher conducted a participant observation research at two DRTSS Offices namely Blantyre and Zomba. The researcher observed that in Blantyre the brokers were all over Road Traffic premises such that one of them offered himself to process a COF for her vehicle without her involvement at every stage as per the requirement. For the sake of comparing, the researcher went to process another COF for the same vehicle in Zomba on the same day. In Zomba, the researcher passed through a normal process whereby a motor examiner examined the vehicle and a normal fee was paid through the bank. The first picture below is a COF which was done in Zomba while the second figure is a COF which broker processed in Blantyre. The difference between the two COFs are that they bear different cover backgrounds. The first one is a genuine one and it bears all the information regarding the vehicle while the second one has nothing of that sort. Another difference is that the first one has date of payment indicated while the second one has no date of payment. Despite processing the COFs on the same date, they bear different expiry dates (28/02/2018 for the authentic one and 27/02.2018 for the fake one). However, the tricky part is that information on the disk which is fixed on vehicle is very resembling such that it can take a Traffic Police Officer who is well conversant with COFs to recognise which one is fake and which one is genuine.

COF/01-2015





CERTIFICATE OF FITNESS
 Road Traffic Act of 1997
 The Road Traffic Certificate of Fitness
 Regulations

Republic of Malawi

OWNER DETAIL:	Traffic Register Number: 20151204086974 Name in Full: RUTH IVY BONGA Postal Address: PRIVATE BAG 247	
CERTIFICATE DETAIL:	BLANTYRE - Malawi Certificate Number: 20180206117393 Certificate Start Date: 28/02/2018 Certificate Expiry Date: 28/02/2019 Date of Issue: 28/02/2018	
VEHICLE DETAIL:	VIN/Chassis Number: KGC100173425 Engine Number: IKR0490867 Vehicle Register Number: 20151205088163 Registration Number: BU2209 Make: TOYOTA Model: PASSO Year of Make: 2007 Vehicle Category: Light Passengers Description: Sedan (closed top) Usage: Private Tare (T) kg: 895 Gross Vehicle Mass (GVM) kg: 1490 Engine Capacity cc: 1000 Seating Capacity: 5 Vehicle Inspection Station: ZOMBA OFFICE	

RECEIPT:
 Receipt Number: ZOM186010553545
 Amount Received: MK 3,000.00
 Payment Date: 28/02/2018

Transaction: GVM <=3500, CLASS C,
 Method Of Payment: Bank deposit
 Received By: 3406
 Payment reference: 20180203513099



INSTRUCTIONS
 1. Cut on the line to remove the Certificate/Permit
 2. Display the Certificate/Permit on the inside of the windscreen or in the disk holder.
 3. Keep the receipt in a safe place.

 20151004126098




No: MW 17 00006 3336 B

ISSUED WITHOUT ANY ALLTERATIONS OR ERASURES

Figure 13: COF produced with help from dobadoba, Source: Directorate of Road Traffic and Safety Services (2018).



Figure 14: COF obtained through normal process.

Source: Directorate of Road Traffic and Safety Services (2018).

4.3.3 Common categories or types of corruption practiced at DRTSS

As the literature points out, corruption is categorized in many ways depending on various circumstances or reasons. The study tested the various categories to find out which ones were common at DRTSS. The members of staff were asked to identify the most common categories of corruption among the following: Direct versus Indirect corruption; monetary versus non-monetary corruption, petty versus grand corruption, political versus administrative corruption and systemic corruption. Upon the researcher's explaining the meaning of the categories to one third of members of staff who responded to the questionnaire, (five out six) pointed out that all the categories are present at DRTSS, but the most common ones were direct corruption, petty corruption, administrative corruption, monetary, non-monetary corruption and systemic corruption. In general, the findings reveal that there is conventional corruption at the DRTSS. As pointed out by Boisvert (2014), conventional corruption occurs when government officials regardless of the position they hold, illegitimately receive or accumulate an undue advantage for their own personal interest. What characterizes mostly conventional corruption is the reciprocal relationship between the giver and the receiver as they both benefit from the transaction. For example, the client gets the services without struggling when he or she pays a bribe while the receiver enjoys the payments he or she gets from the client. The mentioned categories concur with what Heidenheimer, Johnston & LeVine (1989) and Hussein (2005) who advocate that petty and administrative corruption tend to take place at a lower level of bureaucracy who seek to supplement their small salaries.

The key informants from ACB and DRTSS could not state clearly on the categories of corruption when the researcher asked them to mention them. Instead they kept on referring to common forms of corruption such as bribery, influence peddling,

extortion, conflict of interest, nepotism and favouritism. The reason why they were mentioning the forms instead of the categories is that they were not given the categories to choose from.

4.4 Causes of corruption at DRTSS

For the fight against corruption to be successful, there is need to develop strategies that can deal with the root cause of corruption. That is why it was important for this study to also understand the causes of corruption at DRTSS. Principal-Agent theory is a well-known theory which had over the years being used by different countries or institutions to understand the causes of corruption and subsequent development of anti-corruption strategies (Klitgaard 1988). However, in this study, the scope has been widened where by corruption has been looked at as a collective action perspective with a belief that different players contribute to corruption. The two key informants from the ACB highlighted major causes of corruption as follows: social cultural factors, presence of brokers (*dobadobas*), greed, low incentives for public officials, complicated, unclear and ambiguous rules, poverty and poor internet connections. The key informants categorised the above causes into two; namely, human related and organizational related causes. On human related, the two key respondents explained that they mainly concern the behaviour of the individuals. The culture of modern society is individualized other than communal. The respondent from Mzuzu ACB stated that the “me and my family” syndrome is common among the people in the society. The key respondent from Zomba ACB said that corruption is caused by “individual people who do not care about the concerns of the community as long as it provides gains for the individuals themselves.” People prioritize personal problems before they think of societal problems. The organizational related causes emanate

from weak and rigid policies, regulation and rules that create room for corruption in an organization.

Apart from interviewing the key informants on the causes of corruption, the researcher went further to get the opinion of the clients and the members of staff on the causes of corruption as explained by the key informants and literature. The clients were asked to rate their opinion on the possible causes provided in the questionnaire namely: socio-cultural factors of corruption in Malawi, presence of *dobadobas*, greed; poverty; low incentives for officers; poor internet connection and complicated, unclear procedures or mismanaged policies. The respondents were asked to say whether they strongly disagreed, disagreed, were neutral, agreed or they are strongly agreed with the provided causes of corruption.

4.4.1 Social-cultural factors of corruption in Malawi

Social cultural factors as seen from the literature review are one of the causes of corruption. The two key informants from Zomba and Mzuzu ACB agreed that it also contributes to corruption whereby there is a culture among the people in the organization of only wanting to benefit from every endeavour and the one from Mzuzu articulated it as “*tidyapo apa-we will benefit a lot from here*”. One respondent explained that “even these days’ people’s perception is that DRTSS is corrupt such that even if they are able to access a service freely, they still think of corrupting a public officer for assisting them or in order to assist them” The second key respondent (Zomba) gave an example of a cheap and straight forward service of obtaining a DRTSS Identity Card where people still pay a bribe despite being easy to obtain comparing to the other services like COF. In order to complement the above

findings, the study took time to find out from the clients of what they thought about this cause of corruption in regard to DRTSS.




Figure 15: History and culture of corruption in Malawi (total sample of 52), Source: Bonga (2018).

About 68% of the respondents agreed that social cultural factors in Malawi contribute to corruption at DRTSS (38% strongly agrees and 30% agrees), only 22% were not sure if it is a reason behind escalating corruption at DRTSS. However, only 6% strongly disagreed on the cause and 4% disagree. The results agree with Treisman (2009) and Munthali (2010) who also found that history and culture of corruption in a society contribute to corruption. The authors stated that social norms and values especially in Africa encourage corrupt practices. A good example is how nepotistic Malawian culture is. The society holds great expectations that people are supposed to help one another especially those who hold big positions in public institutions. They think that these people should be able to either employ or assist in any way every relative; failing which they will be labelled as rebellious. In the case of DRTSS c,

they expect that official to give preferential treatment to every relative thus breaking the rules for the sake of pleasing the society.

4.4.2 Presence of brokers (dobadobas)

At Blantyre DRTSS, a client is greeted by a number of people popularly known as ‘*dobadobas*’ who offer to assist the clients to obtain services in an easy way at a fee. All the key informants from ACB and DRTSS explained that the presence of *dobadobas* was one of the factors that trigger corruption as these groups of people often mislead people who seek services at the DRTSS. The brokers connive with DRTSS officers to offer services by bypassing some procedures and share the proceeds realised from this act. The first key informant from the DRTSS even pointed out

“tikaika ma posita owonetsa ndondomeko yoyenera kutsata pa service iliyonse pa ma notice board athu, ma dobadoba amachotsa kuti anthu azisowa poyambira ndi cholinga choti azifunsa iwowo kenako they end up kuwapangira zonse”

- Whenever Road Traffic management posts business processes on the notice boards of DRTSS building for the clients to see, the *dobadobas* remove them so that people should not know the processes supposedly to be followed when seeking service and they end up consulting the brokers themselves for assistance.

These brokers perpetuate corruption because they portray the procedures at DRTSS as very cumbersome and difficult to follow. In order to confirm this finding, the study asked the clients if they either agreed or disagreed on whether the presence of brokers triggers corruption at DRTSS. The study adopted two theories namely Principal-Agent and Collective action theories in order to explain the causes of corruption. The former theory is an economic theory which focuses more on the behaviour of the

agent whose acts ensure that personal incentives are maximised. The latter one advocates that concentrating on the behaviour of an agent or the relationship that exist with its principal cannot address the reasons why corruption takes place. Therefore, in this case, collective actions theory is the most relevant theory which challenges the policy makers to look outside the agent as to who can trigger corruption. There are different players who contribute to corruption (Persson, Rothstein & Theorell 2010).




Figure 16: Presence of brokers (dobadobas), Source: Bonga (2018).

A summary from Figure 16 above shows that majority of the respondents agreed that the presence of brokers at DRTSS premises contribute to high corruption at DRTSS (46% strongly agrees and 28% agrees), only 16% were not sure if the presence of *dobadobas* causes corruption at Road Traffic. However, very few disagreed that the presence of *dobadobas* contribute to corruption (6% strongly disagreed on the cause and 4% disagreed). This finding has not been explored by many scholars basing on the literature reviewed but it concurs with what the researcher herself experienced at Blantyre DRTSS, whereby a *dobadoba* offered to process a COF for her vehicle. She was asked to pay Twenty-Five Thousand Kwacha (MK25, 000.00) against a normal

fee of Thirteen Thousand kwacha (MK13, 000.00) for a COF. The *dobadoba* processed the COF (refer to figure 16 above) without the involvement of the owner (the researcher) as per requirement. The requirement is that the owner is supposed to place her finger for the system to recognize ownership of the vehicle. On the contrary, the researcher went to Zomba DRTSS on the same day to compare the experience. At Zomba, there was no *dobadoba* who offered to do the process on her behalf. She processed the COF on her own within a short period of time and a normal fee of MK13, 000.00 was paid (refer to figure 16 above).

In view of the above, it can be concluded that corruption is not only being perpetuated by either the clients or the public officials but a certain group of people. In view of the above, the results agree with Marquette and Peiffer (2015) that many anti-corruption strategies fail because of the theoretical foundation. In this case, the Principal-Agent Theory alone cannot work as the main perpetrator of corruption is not the agent who is a public official; it is a certain group of citizens who are initiating corruption. Therefore, there is need for a collective action to address corruption at DRTSS as it has been seen that it not only the public officials who is propagating corruption but other stakeholders too. Therefore, sensitization on the evils of corruption should not only focus on the public officials but it should extend to the citizens themselves. The enforcement of Client Service Charters can work in this scenario as people would be able to know what procedures to follow when they want services at DRTSS.

4.4.3 Greed

Wandi (2014) and Khan (2006) have argued that greed is one of the factors that cause corruption. They argue that mostly people despite having enough resources, they still

want to have more for themselves at the expense of the poor. The study took time to find out from the clients whether or not they agreed that greed prompts corruption at DRTSS as it is advanced in the literature. Respondents were asked if they either agree or disagree if greed caused corruption at DRTSS.




Figure 17: Greed, Source: Bonga (2018).

Figure 17 indicates that majority of the respondents were not sure if greed contributes to corruption at DRTSS (48%). On the one hand, a slightly bigger chunk of the respondents agreed that greed is a cause of corruption at DRTSS (20% strongly agreed and 14% agreed). 14% disagree and 4% strongly disagreed that greed was the cause of corruption at DRTSS. Even though almost half of the respondents said they were not sure if greed was the cause of corruption at DRTSS but slightly bigger chunk agreed. Therefore, the results agree with what Khan (2006) and Wandu (2014) who

argue that greed is the main cause of corruption. In this case, people are aware that these people are not poor but they want to have more for themselves on top of what they earn from their employer. Normally, the type of corruption which is practised out of greed, the perpetrators are financially stable but they indulge in corruption in order to maintain their high status. This is also where focusing on the Principal-Agent Theory cannot yield better results. It has just been argued that mostly greed is perpetuated by high positioned people who are financially stable. In real sense these people hold a position of a Principal or agents in a society depending on their positioning at the time. They are normally political figures with whom the citizens entrust with responsibility to manage the resources but they do end up betraying that trust for private gain. This is in agreement with what Peiffer and Marguette (2015, p.2) argues that “from this critical perspective, the application of principal-agent theory mistakenlyThis theory therefore is essential in understanding the causes of corruption, what anti-corruption strategies to be put in place and the challenges faced during the implementation of these measuresactively oppose corruption and enforce anti-corruption reforms.” Therefore, the best approach to adopt in order to deal with this cause is to combine both the collective action and the principal agent approach in order to fight against corruption.

4.4.4 Low incentives for officers

The key informants from both the ACB and DRTSS pointed out that provision of low incentives to public officials triggers corruption at Road Traffic. The DRTSSkey informant agreed by stating “mostly corruption is done by those people holding lower positions meaning their incentive is lower than those holding higher positions.” In literature, there is a general consensus that low government wages in developing

countries result in a decline of public sector efficiency and productivity and create both incentives and opportunity for corruption and misuse of public resources (Chene, 2009). However, this is not conclusive enough as some studies have established that highly paid public officials still indulge in corruption out of greed. The study took time to find out from the clients if low incentives for Road Traffic officers contribute to their corrupt behavior.




Figure 18: Low incentives for officers. Source: Bonga (2018).

Respondents were asked if they either agreed or disagreed with the argument that inadequate incentives or low salaries were the primary cause of corruption at DRTSS. At the face of it, figure18 clearly indicates that majority of the respondents were not sure if low incentives for officers contributes to corruption at DRTSS (38%). However, a total of 32% agreed (20% agreed and 12% strongly agreed) that low incentive contribute to corruption. Nevertheless, a total of 30% disagreed (20% disagreed on the cause and 10% strongly disagreed) low incentive is one of the causes of corruption at DRTSS. From the figure above, it can be seen that there is very little difference between those who agree that low incentive contribute to corruption (20%

and 12%) and those who disagree (20% and 10%). This might confirm the contrary arguments which are available regarding the relationship between public officials' wages and corruption. Some argue that pay rise does not have significant effect on corruption. Changes in salary scales may not systematically be associated with changes in corruption (Chene, 2009). The contrary argument states that higher salaries make corruption potentials costlier as corrupt behaviours increase the risk s of losing a highly rewarding job instead of a low paying one. In view of the above it is difficult to come out conclusively as to whether or not wages have an impact on corruption.

4.4.5 Complicated and ambiguous rules and procedures

Langseth (1999) and Begovic (2005) points out that when procedures are not clear or complicated or ambiguous, people are forced to pay bribes in order to shorten the process. As already pointed out by the key informants, the presence of *dobadobas* contributes to making the process long and complicated. The study took time to find out from the clients if they agreed that unclear and complicated procedures contribute to corruption.




Figure 19: Complicated and ambiguous rules and procedures, Source: Bonga (2018).

The figure above shows that majority of the respondents (38%) were not sure if complicated, unclear and ambiguous rules and procedures contribute to corruption at DRTSS. However, a total of another 38% agree (22% agreed and 16% strongly agreed) that unclear procedures contribute to corruption. The study results are in line with what Khan (2006) says that officials do not engage in corruption due to low income but because the conditions allow them to do so. In this case, the complex procedures create a conducive environment for corruption; people are forced to act corruptly in order to bypass the processes. This is similar with what Begovic (2005) found out that lack of time limits and unclear deadlines create an opportunity for public official to work at their own pace thereby forcing the clients to pay bribes for speedy services.

4.4.6 Poverty

Wandi (2014) openly disagrees that poverty is one of the factors that contribute to corruption. The key informant from ACB Mzuzu concurred with Wandi (2014) that poverty does not cause corruption. The key informant from ACB Zomba was not sure whether or not poverty was the reason why people indulge in corrupt activities. The study took time to measure this variable by asking the opinion of the clients whether they agreed or disagreed that poverty is the cause of corruption at DRTSS.




Figure 20: Poverty, Source: Bonga (2018).

The figure above indicates that majority of the respondents; a total of 48% (32% strongly disagreed and 16% agreed) did not agree that poverty contributes to corruption at DRTSS. Nevertheless, a total of 18% (12% agree and 6% strongly agree) agreed that poverty triggers corruption. A large percentage of the respondents concur with Khan (2006) who advances the argument that officials who indulge in corrupt activities do not do that out of poverty. By being employed in the public service, immediately this group of people is ruled out of the poverty line unlike those who do not have any single income generating activity. If poverty was the main cause

of corruption, then it could have followed that poor people in the villages could have been more corrupt. Round Seven (7) of Afro barometer (2017) survey results revealed that rich people are more likely to pay a bribe in order to get a service than poor people (Chunga & Mazalale, 2017). However as suggested by Unver and Koyungu (2016, p. 632) that it is the other way around that corruption perpetuates poverty as it causes damage to resources available for financing government's total expenditure; the government is motivated to spend their revenue to abort other resources.”

4.4.7 Delay caused by poor internet connection

Poor internet connection at DRTSS was one of the causes of corruption pointed out by two key informants from the ACB. The study took time to find out if the clients thought delays created by breakdown of internet fuelled corruption. Respondents were asked if they either agreed or disagreed if delays due to poor network /cause corruption at DRTSS.




Figure 21: Delays due to poor network, Source: Bonga (2018).

The chart above indicates a total of 56% of the respondents (26% agree and 36% strongly agree) that delays due to poor network contributes to corruption at DRTSS.

Nevertheless, 20% were not sure, and a very small percentage disagreed that poor internet connection contributed to corruption. The results are conquering with what the two key informants said as the cause of corruption at DRTSS. One informant had to explain, “Frequent network breakdown also creates backlog leading the DRTSS becoming a reservoir for corruption as people compete or scramble to get the services in good time after waiting for recommencement of network.” This was also conquered by the investigative journalist who confirmed having done an investigation on the same previously. The delays due to network problems create back log forcing people to scramble to get served. The development prompts people to pay bribes to officers directly or through middle persons in order to get the services in time.

4.5 Anti-corruption Strategies implemented at Road Traffic

One of the objectives of the study was to investigate the anti-corruption strategies being implemented at DRTSS. The key respondents were asked to mention anti-corruption strategies being implemented at the DRTSS. They were further asked to explain what is involved in each of the anti-corruption strategies mentioned above. Thereafter, the anti-corruption strategies were tested by asking the members of staff whether they were conversant with some of the anti-corruption strategies. The study has revealed several anti-corruption strategies which the DRTSS is implementing. An analysis will be done to see if they are in line with what other countries or institutions are implementing.

4.5.1 Physical process mapping

The two key informants corroborated and mentioned business/physical process mapping as one of the strategies which the ACB implemented at DRTSS. According to the informants, “the business/physical process mapping is a process that involved the ACB, through its Corruption Prevention Department reviewing systems and procedures at the Road Traffic and extracted all factors which created bottlenecks and acted as reservoirs for corruption.” Soliman (1998) points out that physical process mapping is an essential tool for business process re-engineering. It presents the most economical way to determine the levels of process mapping for the purposes of redesigning. The two respondents gave an example of ACB monitoring the process of issuing driving licenses right from application stage through eye testing, taking photos, payment point and collection of the license. After the physical process mapping they wrote a report where they made some recommendations. This process led to the change in the whole system and also led to the introduction of Malawi Traffic Information System (MALTIS). The process also involved getting views and concerns from employees and clients. At the end of the mapping process a number of recommendations were made and finally led to the overhaul of the whole system.

According to the informants from the ACB, the introduction of the MALTIS firstly requires clients to place one finger at a time, while the new MALTIS all the fingers are placed at the same time. The MRA informant said that

“the MALTIS has enhanced working relationship among the three institutions namely; MRA, Police and Road Traffic thereby reducing tax evasion which was rampant before the MALTIS.”

During the same mapping process, they observed that the procedure of eye testing that required clients to be tested at the hospital; fraudsters took advantage of this requirement by creating fake certificates and date stamps. The new system has an eye testing machine right away at the institution. This strategy is in line with the technological approach South Korea devised in order to fight against corruption (Kim, Kim & Lee, 2009). Lopez (2014) praises this strategy as it minimizes human contact. The Principal Agent theory advocates that corruption takes place by the agent whose principal lacks necessary information to monitor the agent's performance in an effective way (DFID, 2015). In this case, the MALTIS creates opportunity for the principal to monitor the performance of the public officials (agents).

4.5.2 Use of uniforms by Road Traffic officials

The introduction of the wearing of uniforms by officers and use of name tags is another strategy which the key informants highlighted and confirmed by all members of staff who were interviewed. The researcher also personally observed that all officers from messenger to the Director wear uniforms everyday with name tags on their chests. This strategy enables clients to easily identify Road Traffic Officials and minimizing the engagement of brokers or *dobadobas*. Those in the higher-grade wear khaki uniform while those in the lower ranks wear navy blue uniforms with a few exceptions. The researcher has not encountered existing literature that supports this strategy of putting uniform and how it assists in fighting corruption. However, in the researcher's view, this could be an important strategy which can help clients to differentiate between the officers and the *dobadobas*. The key informants at DRTSS pointed out that the *dobadobas* are also trying to frustrate the implementation of this strategy by putting on their improvised uniforms.

4.5.3 Sensitization

The key respondents from DRTSS and ACB highlighted that the strategy of frequent sensitization which involve other stake holders like the ACB had led to the awareness by members of staff as to what is expected of them in terms of their conduct and in case of their involvement of malpractices. All members of staff confirmed having been sensitised on the Fraud and Corruption Prevention Policy and Client Service Charter. Sensitization on issues of ethics is an important strategy which the AU Convention on Preventing and Combating corruption (2003) urges its member States to implement in their public institutions. This is also adopted by New Zealand; a country which is performing well worldwide in terms of fighting corruption. Klitgaard (1998) advocates the issue of educating the people and citizen on how the system works and how the rules and regulations are applied. What Klitgaard is proposing is the application of collective action theory whereby everyone else should be involved in the fight against corruption. He further states that clear standards of conducts and rules of the game make accountability easier. In the case of DRTSS, employees are supposed to know what is expected of them through frequent conduct of sensitization so that if anything goes wrong on their side they are accountable. If sensitization extends to the citizens, they will be able to know the stand taken by DRTSS on the fight against corruption. This will lead to other groups of people like *dobadobas* to refrain from going to the Road traffic to perpetrate corruption.

4.5.4 Integrity committees

The ACB and DRTSS key informants went further to explain another strategy which DRTSS is also implementing thus instituting integrity committees in all its offices which have been tasked to champion anti-corruption drive. DRTSS also established

regional anti-corruption task forces in which all regional heads are members; which champion anti-corruption drives at regional level. This task force is the one that notifies the public on any changes the DRTSS is undergoing. It also displays and secures business processes on all the notice boards for clients to know about what is expected of them in order to obtain required services. It also displays suggestion boxes where people slot in their suggestions on how they want DRTSS operate and areas which need improvements. Integrity management aims to internalize moral values, stimulate moral characters, and improve decision making skills through education, interactive training sessions with group discussions and workshops during entry and in-service programmes (Lawton et al. 2013, p 121). In this case, integrity committee enhances full participation as the employees feel free to listen to their fellow employees unlike from outsiders.

4.5.5 Fraud and corruption prevention policy

Members of Staff were asked to choose any anti-corruption strategies that they knew were being implemented at the DRTSS. 87.5% of the respondents described declaration of wealth by officers as a major strategy currently being implemented. However, this is just one component in the Fraud and Corruption Prevention Policy (2016) which is one of the strategies put in place to fight corruption. The objective of this policy was developed to provide among others, “guidelines and procedures for preventing, detecting, reporting and investigating corruption and fraud in the sphere of Directorate of Road Traffic and Safety Services’ (DRTSS) control”. The policy aims also at promoting an environment and a culture intolerant to corruption; supporting the Directorate to protect its reputation, revenue and other assets” (DRTSS Fraud and Corruption Policy, 2016).

One of the measures stipulated in the policy is to investigate allegations of fraud and corruption and if evidence is gathered appropriate disciplinary actions to be levelled against the concerned officer. The above strategy has been adopted by different countries like Rwanda (News of Rwanda (2016) and Habumuremyi (2016) exponents that in every public officer who is left in-charge of public finance management and other officers are asked to declare their wealth by 30th June every year. The Rwandan's policy goes further to stipulate sanctions against those who fail to meet this condition such as 25% pay cut, dismissals and prosecution. Rwanda has registered success in its anti-corruption fight probably it is because of the stiff enforcement measurements they employ. In the case of DRTSS, the DRTSS Fraud and Corruption Prevention Policy does not clearly stipulate what kind of punishments will be levelled against those who fails to meet the conditions of the policy despite investigating the allegation. It just stipulates that once evidence is gathered disciplinary measures will be taken against the offender. In the researcher's view, the strategy could have been better if the punishments were clearly stated just like what Rwandan Police has done. This is advantageous because it gives public officials a clear picture of the consequences resulting from failure to act according to the policy.

4.5.6 Computerization of service delivery

Both the key informants and the employees who were interviewed confirmed the existence of another strategy which the DRTSS was implementing, computerisation of service delivery. Like the use of MALTIS which is an inter link between the DRTSS and other two other public institutions namely Police and Malawi Revenue Authority (MRA). In an interview with a Systems Development Officer at MRA, he stated that

“the inter-linkage was introduced with an aim of fighting corruption at Road Traffic and curb tax evasion at MRA.”

The process starts at MRA with a production of a Customs Clearance Certificate (CCC) then it goes to Police where Police Clearance Certificate is produced and then finally DRTSS produces a Vehicle Registration Certificate also known as “Blue Book”. Computerization is a strategy which has proven to be effective in South Korea (Kim, 2009 as cited by Kim, 2013).

4.6 Effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies

Assessing the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies at DRTSS was one of the main objectives of the study. As already seen in the literature measuring the level of corruption is not easy later alone measuring the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies. Therefore, in this study, effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies was measured by looking at the presence of some indicators of measuring effectiveness of anti-corruption. In this study, effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies was also measured by looking at clients’ perception on the prevalence of corruption at the Road Traffic.

4.6.1 Effectiveness indicators of anti-corruption strategies

There are several indicators which show that anti-corruption strategies either at country level or institutional level are being effective. These are a shift or change in norms or behavior of officials, serious enforcement of Code of Conduct or anti-corruption policy, strengthened accountability mechanisms such the use of ICT, increased or separate funding for anti-corruption activities, strengthened partnerships,

permanence and independence of partnerships and strengthened capacity through having anti-corruption leadership in an organization, training and sensitization.

4.6.1.1 Shift or change in norms or behaviour

A majority of the members of staff who participated in the study as respondents were of the view that the anti-corruption strategies being implemented at DRTSS were having an impact as there was a shift or change in social norms or behaviour in members of staff. This is similar with what Kim (2013) argues that the formulation of a Code of Ethics and Conduct and anti-corruption policies compel public officers to exercise discretionary powers with caution and aim to promote public interest for fear of punishments if they conduct themselves to the contrary. The researcher was not surprised to hear the members of staff themselves boasting that there had been a change in behaviour as it was obvious that they would not want to portray an image showing that the strategies were not working. On the one hand, it might be true that the formulation of the anti-corruption policies and other anti-corruption strategies had forced the officials to take caution on their conduct. ACB key informants said that it is difficult to measure change in behaviour among the members of staff by just looking at the way people behave unless a corruption perception survey was conducted; however, positively, the members of staff were then conversant with the issues of corruption and its side effects. Formulation of Codes of Ethics and conduct is originated from the Principal Agent theory approach as the strategy aims at changing the behaviour of the individuals as advocated by Klitgaard (1988).

4.6.1.2 Enforcement of code of conduct and anti-corruption policies and service charters

Serious enforcement of code of conduct, anti-corruption policies and other related policies are also an indication of effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies. Road Traffic has Corruption and Fraud Prevention Policy which was developed in 2016 and launched in 2017. The objectives of the policy are firstly, to provide a clear statement, forbidding any corrupt and fraudulent activity and possible negative consequences for failure to adhere to the provisions. The second objective is to provide guidelines and procedures for preventing, detecting, reporting and investigating fraud and corruption. Lastly, it seeks to promote an intolerant environment and culture to fraud and corruption and any other forms of abuse. Among other issues, the policy encourages members of staff to report suspected corrupt practices acts. It also promotes protection of whistleblowers and promises to investigate allegations of corruption. This is in total adherence with UNCAC (2003) which urges public institutions in the member States to follow. However, the policy is not clear as to whether DRTSS has enforcement mechanisms such as trained investigators who would investigate allegations of corruption objectively. The policy is also not clear as to how the whistleblowers would be protected; for example, whether they would allow a person to report suspected issues of corruption anonymously. In the absence of these issues in the policy, it is difficult for employees to report their fellow employees upon suspecting corrupt practices. It one story to have policies in place and another in having mechanisms in place to implement them. Many countries have instruments in place that aim at addressing corruption but the difference among these countries is how enforcement is done. Considering all factors are constant, Codes of Conduct and anti-corruption policies play a role in changing people's behavior including those that can lead to indulging into corrupt behavior (Gilman, 2005). However, these must be

comprehensive, consistent and have practical application (Lawton, Reyner and Lastthuizen, 2013). Whistle blowing is also embedded in the policy and is a powerful tool in the fight against corruption. On one hand, it needs to be treated with care as it might be used as a tool for vengeance. On the other hand, if used well, it has been proved to be an effective way of fighting corruption in many parts of the world; for example, in Nigeria, the government was able to recover billions of stolen government funds through tips from whistle blowers (Kazeem, 2017). From the discussion above; then, it means that the implementation of this strategy was not being done effectively.

Existence of and adherence to Client Service Charter is another milestone which shows that the institution is serious in its fight against corruption. The two key informants mentioned that DRTSS developed a Client Service Charter with an aim of letting people know the process and time to be served on each service. Just like the policies, the service charter needs to be publicized so that both the employees and the citizens should know what and when the services are supposed to be delivered to them.

4.6.1.3 Use of ICT and increased accountability mechanisms

The use of ICT or computerisation of service delivery is another indicator of an effective anti-corruption measure. Almost half of the employee respondents said that the use of ICT had assisted in fighting corruption. The Mzuzu key informant explained that computerization of the process had minimized human factor in the service delivery processes:

Previously, the high way code test was being conducted manually whereby a motor examiner would be pointing at the signs and the candidate would be mentioning their names. In this process, the motor examiner had discretion to declare the candidate pass or fail. The possibility was very high of declaring candidates fail in order to force them pay a bribe.

The key informant from DRTSS stated that the computerization of service delivery had also led to the increase in collection of much revenue. He gave an example that by August in the 2015/2016 financial year the DRTSS had already collected MK375 Million compared to the same period the previous year where the collected MK135 Million. He contributed this improvement to the enrolment of the MALTIS. He went on to state that MALTIS had also assisted in curbing abuse of procedures; for example, previously, it would take long time for a person to renew a driving licence but due to computerization, that process is completed within a day. A Traffic Police Officer who was interviewed said:

“Makomputa wa athandiza kwabasi chifukwa a traffic enafe timatha kudziwa ngati COF iyi ndi yabodza kapena ai, ndipo mwini wake akamachita makani timamutenga kupita naye kukapanga check mu komputa ngati anadinda chala ku Road Traffic”

Technology has assisted a lot because when we suspect a COF to be fake and the owner is insisting that it is genuine, we are able to take the owner to Road Traffic to check in the system to see if his or her finger was printed when obtaining that COF.”

These findings concur with what Kim (2013) pointed out that ICT also allows citizens to have access to government information and participate in service delivery. The same was proved by a Seoul Metropolitan study in South Korea which revealed that anti-corruption e-government initiative made a positive impact on reducing corruption

in local government (Kim 2013). Lopez (2014) agrees with what the key informant in this study said that ICT as a strategy to curb corruption works in such a way that there is less contact between service providers and their client. In the researcher's view that the use of ICT helps to curb corruption as the system leaves audit trail and forensic investigation can easily establish corruption perpetrators. In general, technology approach to fighting corruption enhances transparency and accountability leading to reduced cases of corruption. However, the key informant from ACB reiterated the fact that it is difficult to follow the trail in the services delivery process. This is due to the fact that when there is a need to conduct investigation of corruption involving officers, the Road Traffic Management always refers them to the consultant who installed the MALTIS for records and he is based in Republic of South Africa. This is a Principal Agent theory based strategy which aims at minimising human factor in service delivery. According to this theory, corruption only occurs when the principal is unable to monitor the agent effectively and the agent betrays the principal's interests (Klitgaard, 1988).

4.6.1. 4 Strengthened partnerships

Fighting corruption especially systemic one needs a collective action strategy as dealing with a single section of the society in fighting corruption as advocated by Principal Agent Theory is a mistake as argued by Marquette and Peiffer (2014). Therefore, an institution's seriousness is manifested when it has strengthened partnership with other actors in government like anti-corruption agencies, citizen, civil society, the media, the private sector among others. UNCAC (2003) advocates the same and argues that groups such as these serve not only as watchdogs for government action but they also play a vital role in promoting integrity within their

scope of influence. Transparency International (2012) emphasised the point that collaboration among activist group is also needed to avoid duplication of efforts. This observation is in line with the human rights approach where public institutions are supposed to be open with other institutions by giving them much needed information on how services are delivered. It should be noted that the Principal Agent approach assumes that information asymmetry on the part of the principal leads to corruption by the agent.

The study took time to find out from the employees if they were aware of any partnership which the DRTSS is engaged in. The results revealed that only 12.5% of the respondents was aware of the working partnership meaning the remaining ones did not know about this. The key informants confirmed that the DRTSS is in working partnership with the ACB on issues of anti-corruption. The DRTSS had been engaging the ACB in developing and launching of Fraud and Corruption Prevention Policy. It also involves the ACB on issues of sensitization. This is evidenced earlier in the research where all key informants and the members of staff gave identical definition of corruption.

“The working relationship has enabled the ACB to impart knowledge on the evils of corruption to Road Traffic members of staff and assist in reviewing systems which perpetuated corruption at the institution” (Interview with the key informant from the Road Traffic, 2018).

SA key informant from ACB Blantyre stated:

at first Road Traffic was reluctant to establish the relationship with ACB as they thought that the relationship would exposed their malpractices. Later, establishing the partnership they started thinking

that because of that partnership ACB would be shielding them from being investigated on corruption allegation.

The study also found out that the DRTSS is in a working relationship with MRA where the process of vehicle registration starts. It is also in partnership with the Police where before the vehicle is registered, the police screen it in order to establish if the car was stolen before or not. This is evidenced by the systems which link the three institutions such as MALTIS at Road Traffic, ASYCUDA World and Customs Clearance Certificate Issuance System at MRA and 24/7 at Police.²² These systems link each other and the three institutions are able to share information (Interview with MRA Systems Development Officer, 2018).

With the results showing that corruption is still taking place at DRTSS despite these working relationships, it would mean that something is being done in a wrong way. Countries like Botswana which are doing well in the corruption fight has also adopted the same strategy of working with the anti-corruption agency called Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC). The problem could be how this relationship is being implemented. Here in Malawi, according to the ACB informants, the ACB is involved whenever there is a special programme meaning that most of the time, the public institution is left alone to do the job of fighting corruption. In such a case, there is possibility of public institutions relaxing and do what they want. This is different from what Botswana is doing; the DCEC attaches its officers in all public institutions who work on full time but still under employment of the DCEC (DCEC Report, 2013). In this case, the DCEC is involved on daily basis thereby creating no

²² Interview with an MRA Officer on 16/06/2018 in Blantyre

chance for public officers to engage in corruption. Furthermore, the institution taps knowledge from the attached officers at a convenient time and place unlike here in Malawi where they are consulted occasionally. Their presence also creates fear to other players who would come to initiate corruption like *dobadobas* at DRTSS. In view of the above, the working relationship with other stakeholders is not being effective basing on the employees and key informants' responses. Peiffer and Marquette (2015., p. 2) argues that fighting corruption is overwhelmingly influenced by principal-agent theory, which depicts corruption as occurring when public officials who have discretion over the provision of public services lack accountability. When applied to anti-corruption, this lens emphasizes the rational choices that take place in individual incidents of corruption, implicitly assuming that corruption is 'solvable' with policies that can alter these individual calculations. An approach which can explain this effectiveness indicator is collective action theory which advocates that fighting corruption is not a one-man job because mostly corruption is perpetrated by different quarters.

4.6.1.5 Strengthened capacity

Capacity building in the area of fighting corruption is one of the indicators that show effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies. The effectiveness can be measured if the organizations take initiative to train or sensitize its staff in the areas of corruption; if there is separate leadership to lead the fight against corruption; training and sensitization of employees on the evils of corruption; separate and enough funding for anti-corruption activities among others. The study took time to find out from the employees if the DRTSS had strengthened capacity such as training, leadership and budget for the anti-corruption activities; the results showed that one 87.5% believed

that this strategy was not being effective. The response might also indicate that the employees were not conversant with what was happening in the institution in regard to corruption fight because the key informants from ACB and DRTSS confirmed that the DRTSS had taken a step up in strengthening the capacity by choosing an anti-corruption coordinator responsible for coordinating anti-corruption activities. However, this coordinator has other duties as he also works as Chief Traffic Officer and his office is always busy. In that case, although the DRTSS showed commitment of choosing leadership to lead on the issues of fighting corruption; the commitment falls short after choosing someone who has his other important core duties to play in the organization and puts anti-corruption duties as part time duties; hence, frustrating the efforts.

As one way of measuring effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies, the study examined whether or not the DRTSS has separate budget for anti-corruption activities. The DRTSS key informant confirmed that since 2016, they include a budget specifically for the anti-corruption activities such as sensitization, trainings and other related activities. Separate but also enough budget show commitment of the institution on the issues of preventing corruption.

As part of measuring effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies at DRTSS, the study also took time to find out from the clients on what they thought about corruption at DRTSS.

4.6.2 Prevalence of corruption at DRTSS (client's views)

As another way of trying to measure effectiveness of the above anti-corruption strategies at the DRTSS; the study took time to measure clients' general perception on corruption trend at DRTSS. Clients were asked to rate the dominance of corruption at the DRTSS by saying whether it was very high, high, medium, low or very low. Banerjee et al (2011 as cited in Hanna 2011,) outlines the history of the methodologies that have been used for measuring corruption. He says apart from using qualitative data as done by key informants and the employees to describe specific channels of corruption, the use of perception-based studies to produce cross time datasets.




Figure 22: Prevalence of corruption, Source: Bonga (2018).

From the figure above, a total of 65.31% said corruption is high with 24.49% saying very high while 40.82% saying it is just high. It is also worth noting that a total of 8%

said that corruption is low at DRTSS. This perception gives a picture how the people perceive corruption at DRTSS. This confirms report on the findings of 2005 Governance and Corruption survey done by the ACB which revealed that DRTSS was a breeding ground for corruption. The difference is that this perception has not changed despite the DRTSS developing anti-corruption strategies like, fraud and corruption policies in which there are provisions which urge employees not to indulge in corruption, computerization of services delivery is another strategy which could have made the difference but it looks like human factor is still playing a bigger part in service delivery.

4.6.3 Containing corruption at DRTSS

To measure the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies, the study asked the clients if DRTSS was doing enough to contain corruption comparing to the previous three years thus 2015, 2016 and 2017.

Results from the clients' views reveal that more than half of the respondents (52%) said DRTSS was not doing enough to contain corruption; while 24% indicated that it has been contained. What is interesting with this study is that earlier, the clients very few confirmed having participated in all forms of corruption but when asked to state how they perceived corruption, the percentage is high confirming that corruption is high and that DRTSS is not doing enough to contain it. Probably, the reason could be that no one wants to be seen as corrupt.

4.7 Challenges faced by DRTSS in implementing Anti-corruption strategies

The study aimed at assessing the effectiveness of the anti-corruption strategies at DRTSS. However, encountering of challenges during implementation of the strategies is inevitable. Therefore, the final objective of the study was to investigate challenges faced by DRTSS during implementation of the anti-corruption strategies.

The study sought views from the key informants on what they thought were the challenges being faced by the DRTSS. The key informants mentioned challenges such as the presence of brokers at DRTSS premises, resistance to change by members of staff, partial use of ICT, Delay in outsourcing of some services.

4.7.1 Presence of brokers at Road Traffic

The first ACB informant stated that one of the challenges that was affecting the DRTSS during implementation of the anti-corruption strategies was the presence of *dobadobas* who mostly connive with officers inside and share proceeds realized from corrupt acts. The key informant ACB Zomba while confirming the presence of brokers as a challenge, he cited an example that “the *dobadobas* go as far as removing posters which details the business processes of the services delivered at Road Traffic.” This leaves the clients confused hence resorting to consulting the *dobadobas* themselves who are always present at Blantyre DRTSS office. The same informant pointed out that the *dobadobas* were trying to frustrate the strategy of wearing uniforms as some of them had started wearing improvised uniforms with sole purpose of confusing the clients. This is a unique feature which is not being backed by literature. Much as it is being pointed out that the presence of *dobadobas* poses a challenge, the researchers’ view is that the problem is with DRTSS management itself

which is failing to put punitive measures against the *dobadobas*. This may be because it is a syndicate whereby they all benefits from the acts. For example, a client offered a suggestion on how to deal with *dobadobas* by saying

“Nzosavutatu kathana ndimadobadobawa aku Road Traffic chifukwa akhoza kungowauza apolisi kuti aziwagwira. Koma ine ndikudziwa sangatero chifukwa amadyera mommo-It is not difficult to do away with middle persons at Road Traffic. The directorate can engage the police to be arresting them. But I know they cannot do that because the Road Traffic people benefit from the same people.”

This clearly shows that the Road Traffic tolerates corruption by allowing the brokers to be operating from their premises without putting any measures to prevent this from happening.

In an interview with the journalist from Times Group, he stated that:

the *dobadobas* do not do the job alone. They have officers inside who gives priority to the work brought by the *dobadobas* because they benefit from it. They have a specific fee for the part they play. Some officers provide the *dobadobas* with protected stationery which enable them to provide similar services outside the Road Traffic.

This observation is in line with the critique by Person, Rothstein and Theorell (2010) that corruption cannot be fought by using the Principal Agent theory approach alone as viewed by Klitgaard (1988). Person et. Al., (2010) advocate that corruption should be viewed as a collective action problem whereby everyone is believed to be involved as the incentives of being involved in corruption outweighs its abstinence. The connivance that exists between the Road Traffic Officers and the *dobadobas* is a clear testimony of the collective activities.

4.7.2 Resistance to change by members of staff

Another challenge faced by DRTSS according to the Blantyre ACB informant is staff resistance to change. The members of staff refused to accept the fact that the institution was adopting a new way of doing its businesses aiming at fighting corruption. The key informant gave an example of computerization of service delivery that received frustration because most members of staff feared that they would lose their jobs. This challenge is similar to what was found in the study by Boehm (2014) which revealed that lack of interest by sector staff to implement some strategies frustrates the efforts. Mostly, members of staff become resistant to change if the old processes led them to benefit from corrupt acts without being detected and that they feared that the new procedure would be able to expose their wrong doings. In this case, it was justified for staff at DRTSS to resist the computerization initiative as they knew that it would lead to leaving trail on the processes done in a corrupt way.

4.7.3 Discretionary powers of officers

Another challenge which the research revealed through the Zomba ACB key informant was that, despite the introduction of ICT in the service delivery, human factor was still there, whereby officer's discretion was still counted. This informant gave an example that a case where discretion is exercised and leads to corruption, was the way the driving test was being done. "The motor examiner goes to the testing site alone with the candidate without any checking points. That result in the officer having discretion either to fail the candidate or declaring pass to an incompetent candidate upon receipt of a bribe as there was no one at the testing site to conduct checks and balances. The World Bank (2009) and Klitgaard, Lindsey and Maclean (1999) pointed out that discretionary power is also a factor that leads to corruption whereby public

officials can decide whether to render a service or not. This is similar to the research finding where the public official has the discretion of declaring a candidate's pass or fail. Normally, the public officials use those discretionary powers to put their clients at bay and in the end forced to pay bribes.

4.7.4 Delay in outsourcing services

Another challenge explained by Mzuzu ACB key informant was Road Traffic's delay in outsourcing the process of obtaining COFs. As it was, the Road Traffic was conducting a lot of transactions in this area, hence, the place turned into a breeding ground for corruption. For example, instead of just performing regulatory work, the Road Traffic was performing all the work by itself such as regulating, assessing and delivering the services. According to the informant, this work was supposed to be done by a private company. In other words, Road Traffic should move away from performing all the work by itself and consider forming a Public Private Partnership (PPP). Public-Private Partnerships refers to arrangements where a private sector supplies infrastructure assets and infrastructure-based services that traditionally have been provided by the government (Heming, 2006, p. 1). COF is a service which was selected during the 2015 Public Sector Reform process to be deregulated. The present study has also revealed that it is the same service that attracts corrupt activities more than any other services rendered by DRTSS. Therefore, it is not surprising that DRTSS might meet some resistance from members of staff to contract out the processing of COFs as it is a conduit of gaining corrupt money. This suggestion supports what Klitgaard (1988) reported about what Hong Kong did in its local councils of contracting out some of the services to private companies.

4.8 Chapter summary

The chapter has presented the research findings and discussions relating to the literature. The study adopted the mixed approach of using both qualitative and quantitative data. The chapter has defined the term corruption based on the staff view, and has discussed its causes. Finally, the study has presented the strategies implemented to overcome corruption at DRTSS and their effectiveness. Chapter Five therefore presents a summary of the study following the findings and limitation of the results.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

5.1 Overview of the study

This study assessed the effectiveness of integrated anti-corruption strategies at the DRTSS. To achieve this main objective, the study used the mixed method approach whereby both quantitative and qualitative methods were used to collect and analyse data. The main research question of the study was: How effective are the anti-corruption strategies being implemented by the DRTSS? In order to answer this main question, the study also to explore more of what constitutes corruption in terms of its definition, forms and categories in the context of the DRTSS in Malawi. The study also focused on investigating factors that trigger corruption at Road Traffic. Furthermore, an analysis was done on how the anti-corruption strategies are implemented. Assessment of effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies was done by analysing the effective indicators and clients' perceptions towards corruption at DRTSS. Challenges during implementation of strategies are inevitable; therefore, the study aimed at examining the challenges faced by DRTSS during implementation of these strategies. The study adopted both the Principal Agent theory and Collective Action as they both proved to be relevant and complementary to the study.

5.2 Research findings summary

The study found out that understandings of corruption vary from country to country. It was also found out that public institutions such as DRTSS are devising and implementing strategies aiming at fighting against corruption. Therefore, the main objective of the study was to assess the effectiveness of these anti-corruption strategies.

5.2.1 Understanding the concept of corruption

There is a general consensus that corruption is a multifaceted phenomenon, which manifests itself in different forms. Some equate corruption with fraud, embezzlement, theft and smuggling while others view it in relation to the amount of bribes offered and accepted. Corruption also manifests itself in a form of extortion whereby a public official threatens to use (or abuse) state power or violence to induce the payment of a bribe. The study found out that in the context of DRTSS, there is no violence involved but public officials threaten to withhold a service unless a bribe is paid. To acquire a more nuanced understanding of the concept of corruption, the study analysed the common types of the phenomenon at DRTSS – administrative corruption, which takes place when public officials discharge their duties. Another category of corruption that exists at DRTSS is petty corruption whereby small amounts of money are involved. Since the people involved in corrupt activities are appointed public officials then automatically the type of corruption that takes place is bureaucratic one and not political corruption.

5.2.2 Causes of corruption

The study confirmed what the literature suggests that history and social cultural factors are among the reasons why corruption exists at DRTSS. The study found out that communal culture in Malawi contributes to corruption as people expect preferential treatment when they are related to public officials. Another factor that triggers corruption is the presence of middle persons commonly known as *dobadobas* at the DRTSS. The study found out that the *dobadobas* connive with Road Traffic officials to offer services at an extra fee. Greed is also factor that triggers corruption. Public officials do not indulge in corrupt activities out of poverty but in order to acquire additional benefits. The study further found out that due to low incentives given to public officials, corruption is triggered to a greater extent. This finding concurs with diverse arguments in the literature that if public officials are highly paid they may not indulge in corruption. On the contrary, some argue that an increase in salaries will not prevent public officials from indulging in corruption as some of them do it out of greed. The study also found out that complicated and ambiguous procedures at DRTSS contribute to corruption. When procedures are unclear, third persons like *dobadobas* take advantage in offering their ‘assistance’ to stranded clients and in the process perpetuate corruption. Despite computerisation of service delivery at DRTSS, frequent internet break downs contribute to corruption as the work-load piles up forcing people to pay bribe in order to be served on time. Some literature suggests that poverty is another cause of corruption. On the contrary, study found out that poverty is not one of the main causes of corruption. This is an argument that has been advanced that if poverty triggered corruption, then poor people in the village would be more corrupt. This is supported by survey results of the

Afro-barometer (2017) which revealed that Malawians believed that rich people were more likely to pay a bribe than poor people.

5.2.3 Anti-corruption strategies implemented at Road Traffic

The study found out that physical mapping process is one of the anti-corruption strategies employed by the DRTSS and led to the introduction of other anti-corruption strategies such as use of technology in service delivery. The introduction of Malawi Traffic Information System (MALTIS) is a product of computerization of service delivery which resulted from the physical mapping process. Another strategy which was introduced at DRTSS was the putting on of uniform and name tags by officials. DRTSS also undertook sensitisation campaigns on fraud and corruption prevention policy and client service charter among its officials. The sensitization is carried out in the integrity committees which were instituted. Klitgaard (1988) believes that educating employees and citizens on how systems work and how rules and regulations are applied help in the fight against corruption. However, the study found out that DRTSS does not have mechanisms of enforcing the anti-corruption policy; for example, it does not have investigations section to investigate corruption allegations.

5.2.4 Measuring effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies

The study found out that the presence of Fraud and Corruption Prevention Policy had contributed to change in social norms and behaviour among officials as the policy encompasses some rules of conducts. The introduction of uniforms is another strategy that has also contributed to the reduction of corruption. Clients are able to deal with the officials directly unlike in the past when they could not differentiate between an official and a *dobadoba* when obtaining services. The study further found out that

despite having an anti-corruption policy and a client service charter which guides officials on how they should conduct themselves when discharging their duties, the policy does not stipulate the mechanisms of enforcing these instruments. For example, DRTSS does not have a division that can investigate allegations of corruption. Moreover, there are no provisions stipulated in the policy on how whistle-blowers can be protected. The use of ICT in service delivery has reduced time for the delivery of services at DRTSS. For example, one can renew a driving licence and collect it on the same day unlike in the past hence leaving no chance of thinking of corrupting an officer in order to be served. The study also found out that DRTSS had strengthened working relationships with other stakeholders such as ACB, MRA and the police. Registration of vehicle passes through the other institutions to make sure that there is no tax evasion and theft involved. The study found out that capacity is weak in terms of leadership; for example, the ethics coordinator has other core duties to perform which keep him busy from performing anti-corruption activities. Budgetary constraint to carry out anti-corruption activities is another indication that DRTSS lacks capacity in carrying out anti-corruption activities.

The study results also indicate that clients still rate the prevalence of corruption as very high despite a higher number of participants indicating that they had never paid a bribe DRTSS officials. Perhaps this was because normally, people do not want to openly be associated with corrupt acts. The study further established that for the past three years namely 2015, 2016 and 2017 corruption had not been contained at Road Traffic despite having anti-corruption strategies in place.

5.2.5 Challenges faced by Road Traffic when implementing anti-corruption strategies

Examining challenges faced during implementation of anti-corruption strategies was one of the objectives of the study. Therefore, the study found out that the presence of *dobadobas* at Road Traffic highly affects implementation of anti-corruption strategies. The *dobadobas* remove posters which outline procedures to be followed by clients when obtaining services. Resistance to change by members of staff is another challenge which the study found out and this is affecting the implementation of anti-corruption strategies at Road Traffic. Members of staff prefer doing things using an old routine because there are benefits associated with it. The study further found out that discretionary powers exercised by officers in the course of discharging their duties contribute to corruption; for example, assessing driving tests still remain at the discretion of the motor examiner only as there are no any checks and balances. Delaying in privatising some of services has also contributed to the rising of corruption at DRTSS.

In summary, the study has found out that there are different forms of corruption that are being practiced at DRTSS and that there are different factors that trigger this corruption. To show its commitment in combating corruption, the Road Traffic has developed strategies of which some are registering successes while some are yet to register success.

5.3 Conclusion and observations

From the study, it cannot be conclusively stated that DRTSS has completely failed in terms of effectively implementing anti-corruption strategies. The study has observed that there are some strategies which have shown some effectiveness; for example, the use of ICT has proved to be effective. Clients are able to obtain services within a short period of time unlike in past; such as one is able to renew his or her licence and get it on the same day within a short period of time unlike in the past before MALTIS. If clients are able to obtain services within the shortest period of time, then there is low engaging in corruption. Furthermore, clients are not restricted to go to particular DRTSS Office which they registered their vehicle for the first time, they can obtain the service at any DRTSS office as the offices are electronically interlinked. The presence of Fraud and Corruption Policy is one of the strategies which has not registered success as the study has found out that there are no mechanisms which were put in place to enforce the policy.

Finally, issues of corruption have always been sensitive such that they are always discussed in private. As a result, some respondents were not comfortable to answer all the questions put forward to them. This situation was taken care of by collecting the information from different sources thereby confirming the collective action theory which advocates that corruption is not for one institution to fight, it is a problem that needs collective action and also needs collective efforts. It will therefore be interesting for the future study to enlarge the sample so that the outcome should be more practical with fewer errors and proper generalization. The study was conducted at DRTSS as one of the monopolistic government institutions that deal with various clients directly when providing services. It will therefore be interesting to conduct

similar studies in other monopolistic government institutions, such as the Department of Immigration, the Malawi Revenue Authority and the Electricity Supply Corporation of Malawi among others.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Questionnaire for Road Traffic Clients

My name is Ruth Ivy Bonga-Leonard, a student pursuing Master's Degree in Public Administration and Management at Chancellor College, University of Malawi and I am assessing the effectiveness of the anti-corruption strategies at the Road Traffic. The research is a requirement for completion of my Master's Degree in Public Administration and Management course. The results of the survey are for academic purposes only and will not be used otherwise.

You are therefore requested to be honest and frank in responding to the questions below. Confidentiality, secrecy and anonymity will at all cost be maintained, as such you do not need to indicate your name or phone number on the questionnaire.

Instruction

You are requested to give the answer that you think best describes your views. Please tick one option, unless advised otherwise. The questionnaire is divided into four sections: Section A, B, C and D.

SECTION A

BIODATA

1. Gender: Female [] Male []
2. Service (s) sought _____
3. Number of years of being client at Road Traffic_____

SECTION B- ROAD TRAFFIC RELATED QUESTIONS

I. CONCEPT OF CORRUPTION

1) How many times have you gone to Road Traffic to seek services since 2014?

Once	More than once	Not Sure	None

2) Do you understand the meaning of the term corruption?

Yes	No	Not sure

3) a) Have you ever been forced to pay an illegitimate payment to a Road Traffic officer apart from the designated fees?

Yes	No	Not sure

b) If yes what services were you looking for at the Road Traffic? Choose the relevant answers below

Certificate of Fitness	Driving License	Road Traffic Registration Card	Change of Motor vehicle ownership	Other

4) Have you ever paid illegitimate money of your own free will on top of the required amount of fees to a Road Traffic Officer in order to obtain a service in time?

Yes	No	Cannot remember

b) If the answer to 3 is yes, what services did you pay illegitimate money for at the Road Traffic? (Choose the answers below)

Certificate of Fitness (COF)	Driving license	Road Traffic Identification Card	Change of motor vehicle ownership	Other

5) Have you ever been assisted by a broker a friend at Road Traffic to obtain any service in time at Road Traffic?

Yes	No	Cannot remember

b) If the answer to 6 is yes, what services do you normally pay unlawful money for at the Road Traffic? Tick the answers below

Certificate of Fitness (COF)	Driving license	Road Traffic Identification Card	Change of motor vehicle ownership	Other

6) If the answers to either 3 or 4 or are yes, were you given a genuine service after paying that extra money?

Yes	No	Cannot remember

II. EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGIES

7) How do you rate the prevalence of corruption at the Road Traffic comparing to three years ago? (Tick)

Prevalence of Corruption	Very low	Low	Medium	High	Very high

b) Give reason for your answer.

.....

8) Do you think corruption is being contained at the Road Traffic now comparing to three years ago?

Yes	No	I don't know

b) Give reasons for your answer for your answer.

.....

THANK YOU!

Appendix II: Interview Guide for Two Key Informants

I am a student pursuing Master's Degree in Public Administration and Management with Chancellor College, University of Malawi and I am **assessing effectiveness of the anti-corruption strategies at the Road Traffic**. The research is a requirement for completion of my Master of Arts in Public Administration and Management Degree course. The results of the research are for academic purposes only and will not be used otherwise.

INSTRUCTION

You are therefore requested to be honest and frank in responding to the questions below. Confidentiality, secrecy and anonymity will at all cost be maintained, as such you do not need to indicate your name on the questionnaire.

SECTION A

BIO DATA

Present position _____

Number of years in the position _____

How long have you been working with Road Traffic _____

SECTION B: ROAD TRAFFIC RELATED QUESTIONS

Objective one (1)- Concept of corruption

1. Explain to me your understanding of a term corruption in the context of Road Traffic and Safety Services
2. What common forms or types of corruption are prevalent at the Road Traffic

Objective two (2)- Causes of Corruption

3. In your view what could be the conditions that would lead an officer to be involved in corruption at the Road Traffic?

Objective three (3)- Anti-Corruption Strategies

4. Which of the following anti-corruption strategies are being implemented at the Road Traffic and Safety Services? (Tick the ones available at the Road Traffic)

- a) **Declaration of wealth by officers** []
- b) **High wages** []
- c) **Computerization of service delivery** []
- d) **Partnership with other stakeholders** []
- e) **Codes of conduct and ethics** []
- f) **Anti-corruption policy** []
- g) **Whistle blowing policy** []
- h) **Disciplinary procedures** []
- i) **ANY OTHER APART FROM THE ABOVE**

5. Explain what is involved in each of the anti-corruption strategies mentioned above?

D. Objective three (4) - Effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies

6. May you comment on how effective the Anti-corruption strategies you have chosen and mentioned in number 4? Please explain in detail.
7. Which of the following indicators of effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies are present at the Road Traffic and Safety Services?

- a) **Shift or change in social norms or behaviour** []
- b) **Enforcement of codes of conduct, policies** []
- c) **Increased funding for anti-corruption activities** []

- d) Strengthened partnerships []**
- e) Strengthened accountability mechanisms []`**
- f) Permanence and independence of the institution []**
- g) Strengthened capacity such as training, leadership []**
- h) Use of information Communication Technology []**

Objective five (5)- Challenges face the Directorate

8. Explain challenges the Road Traffic and Safety Services is facing in the implementation of the anti-corruption strategies?

Thank You!

Appendix III: Questionnaire for Road Traffic Staff

I am a student pursuing Master's Degree in Public Administration and Management with Chancellor College, University of Malawi and I am assessing the effectiveness of the anti-corruption strategies at the Road Traffic. The research is a requirement for completion of my Masters in Public Administration and Management degree course. The results of the survey are for academic purposes only and will not be used otherwise.

You are therefore requested to be honest and frank in responding to the questions below. **Confidentiality, secrecy and anonymity** will at all cost be maintained, as such you **do not need** to indicate **your name** and **phone number** on the questionnaire.

INSTRUCTION

You are requested to give the answer that you think best describes your views. Please tick one option, unless advised otherwise. The questionnaire is divided into two sections: Section A and Section B

SECTION A

BIODATA

1. Gender: Female [] Male [] 2. Present position _____
3. Number of years in the position _____
4. How long have you been working with Road Traffic _____
5. Duty Station _____

SECTION B- ROAD TRAFFIC RELATED QUESTIONS

I. Objective one (1) – the concept of corruption

- 1) Explain to me your understanding of a term corruption in the context of the Directorate of Road Traffic and Safety Services (DRTSS)?

-
-
- 2) In your opinion, which ones are the forms of corruption? (Please tick 1 to 5- 1 being the highest and 5 the lowest);
- a) Bribe [] b) Fraud [] c)Embezzlement [] d)Extortion [] e)Theft []
 f)Nepotism [] g)Favouritism [] h)Misuse of public resources (financial, time and human resources) [] i) Conflict of interest []
- 3) Which ones are the common categories of corruption you think can be found at the DRTSS? (Please tick 1 to 5- 1 being the highest and 5 the lowest);
- a) Direct corruption/indirect corruption []
 b) Monetary (money involved)/non-monetary (money not involved) corruption []
 c) Petty (small)/ grand (Big) corruption []
 d) Political/administrative corruption []
 e) Systematic(routed) corruption []
 f) Investive Corruption (future benefits) []

II. Objective two (2)-Causes of Corruption

- 4) What do you think could be the reasons why someone can be forced to engage in corrupt activities? (Tick 1 to 5- 1 being the highest and 5 the lowest);
- a) Poor Public policies (rules and regulations) that promote corruption []
 b) Low salaries [] c)Greed [] d) Low probability of being caught and punished
 e) Dishonesty [] f)Poverty [] h) Societal Culture of Corruption []
 i)Presence of agents (dobadobas) []

III. Objective three (3) - Anti Corruption measures

- 5) Mention any anti-corruption activities which you are aware of being implemented by DRTSS

.....
.....

- 6) Tick any anti-corruption measures which you are aware of being implemented by DRTSS

j) Declaration of wealth by officers []

k) High wages []

l) Computerization of service delivery []

m) Partnership with other stakeholders (organization) []

n) Service Client Charter []

o) Corruption and Fraud Prevention policy []

p) Introduction of Uniform and name tags for officers []

q) Disciplinary procedures []

r) Training and Sensitization of officers on evils of corruption []

IV. Objective four (4) - Effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies

- 7) Which anti-corruption measures mentioned above have you been involved in implementing them?

.....
.....

- 8) Apart from the above corruption prevention strategies, what other anti-corruption activities taking place at the DRTSS have you taken part?

.....
.....

9) Which anti-corruption strategies mentioned and chosen do you think are working at the DRTSS?

.....

10) Give reasons for your answer on each anti- corruption strategies mentioned in question 9?

.....

11) How do you rate the effectiveness of those anti-corruption measures put in place at the Road Traffic? (Tick)

Very Low	Low	Medium	High	Very high

THANK YOU!!!

**Appendix IV: Names of Employees at Eastern Region Directorate of Road
Traffic and Safety Service- Zomba Office**

SERIAL NUMBER	NAME OF EMPLOYEE	POSITION
1.	Maurice SC Mavumbe	Regional Road Traffic Officer
2.	Innocent Solani	Road Traffic Officer
3.	Tiwonge Mkandawire	System Analyst
4.	Fredrick Lembo	Programmer
5.	Edward Sankhulani	Data Preparation Clerk
6.	Mphatso Maluwa	Data Preparation Clerk
7.	Herbert Pindani	Data Preparation Clerk
8.	Memory Nayeja	Data Preparation Clerk
9.	Ken Ndhlovu	Data Preparation Clerk
10.	Lonjezo Kapepula	Senior Assistant Accountant
11.	Vincent Robeni	Assistant Accountant
12.	Brenda Mjumira	Assistant Accountant
13.	Perseverance Msiska	Clerk Officer
14.	Tryness Kaluwa	Copy Typist
15.	Emmanuel Besteni	PBX Operator
16.	Christopher Chokani bwino	Security Guard
17.	Tamandani Phiri	Messenger
18.	Owen Phiri	Messenger
19.	Kondwani Mitawa	Messenger

20.	Charles Nyalapa	Messenger/Security Officer
21.	Lyston Khonje	Messenger
22.	Master Kamwendo	Messenger
23.	Hussein Wazakali	Messenger

Appendix V: Letter of Introduction



Principal
Prof. Richard Tambulasi, BA (Pub Admin), BPA (Hons), MPA, PhD

On Ref: PA/4/11
Your Ref:

CHANCELLOR COLLEGE
P.O. Box 280, Zomba, Malawi
Telephone: (265) 01524 222
Fax: (265) 01524 045
Email: principal@ccz.mw

Department of Political and Administrative Studies

22nd January 2018

The Director General
Anti-Corruption Bureau
P.O. Box 2437
LILONGWE

Dear Sir/Madam,

LETTER OF INTRODUCTION: MRS RUTH LEONARD-BONGA- MA/PAM/22/16

The bearer of this letter is **Mrs Ruth Leonard-Bonga**. She is a Master in Public Administration and Management student in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at Chancellor College.

Our students are required to write a dissertation in order to complete their master's programme. Therefore, Mrs Bonga intends to carry out a data gathering exercise for this purpose in your office.


Any assistance rendered to him in the course of this exercise will be highly appreciated. Let me also point out that the information gathered will be treated as confidential and purely for academic purposes.

Yours faithfully,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, likely belonging to Associate Prof. Happy M. Kayuni.

Associate Prof. Happy M. Kayuni, PhD
HEAD OF DEPARTMENT

HMK/am



Appendix VI: Letter of Introduction



Principal
Prof. Richard Tambulasi, BA (Pub Admin), BPA (Hons), MPA, PhD
Un Ref: PA/4/11
Your Ref:

CHANCELLOR COLLEGE
P.O. Box 283, Zomba, Malawi
Telephone: (265) 01524 222
Fax: (265) 01524 046
Email: principal@ccw.mw

Department of Political and Administrative Studies

14th August 2017

The Director
The Directorate of Road Traffic and Safety Services
P/Bag 257
LILONGWE

Dear Sir/Madam

LETTER OF INTRODUCTION: MS RUTH LEONARD-BONGA

The bearer of this letter is **Ms Ruth Leonard-Bonga**. She is a Master of Public Administration and Management student in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at Chancellor College.

Our students are required to write a dissertation in order to complete their master's programme. Therefore, Ms Bonga intends to carry out a data gathering exercise for this purpose in your office.

Any assistance rendered to her in the course of this exercise will be highly appreciated. Let me also point out that the information gathered will be treated as confidential and purely for academic purposes.

Yours faithfully,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'HMK'.

Associate Prof. Happy M. Kayuni, PhD
HEAD OF DEPARTMENT

HMK/am

