This thesis focuses on the effects of high incumbency turnover of Members of Parliament on representation. Malawi has one of the highest turnover rates of incumbent members of parliament in Africa. Studies from established democracies indicate that high incumbency turnover aids representative democracy as new members bring innovation and quality. These studies further indicate that high turnover makes members of parliament responsive to their constituents. These views are coming from the old democracies where turnover is very low. New democracies especially in Africa, such as Malawi, experience high rates of turnover. Unfortunately this subject has not received much attention in the African region. This thesis therefore set out to find the effects under the latter environment. The study utilized both quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection, through desk research, interviews and focus group discussions. The study examined the effects in four constituencies: two in the southern and two in the central regions of Malawi and came up with some interesting trends. There exists a slight relationship between constituents’ satisfaction with an incumbent MP and his/her retention. Satisfaction of the constituents is key to the MPs reelection and in the constituencies studied, constituents expressed dissatisfaction with their MPs as individuals and those who got re-elected in previous elections got their chance due to party influence and financial capability as well as patrimonial tendencies. Rent maximization is one of the direct effects of high incumbency turnover and involves representatives’ deviating from constituents interests. Rent maximization that has been given in this study includes maximizing financial gains, defections and low roll call participation. This thesis also show MPs rent maximization can lead to voter apathy. It further shows that, what drives the incumbent MPs to maximize rents in extreme cases of high turnover is the fact that they fear for their job security. The thesis further shows other effects such as the weakening of political parties. Consequently democracy weakens as people participation goes down. When all the findings are pooled together this study concludes that effects of high incumbency turnover on representation both from constituents’ expectations and the ideals of the word are numerous and adverse.

Against the claim that democracy influences good policy due to competition, this thesis argues that competition in young fragmented democracies brings insecurity to ruling regimes and this influences introduction and implementation of short term policies including poorly designed subsidy policies aimed at getting votes. A comparative analysis of political economy factors influencing subsidy policies in the area of agriculture and housing was conducted for the two countries: Malawi and Tanzania, the former being a more competitive but fragmented party system while the latter, a dominant party system. The study used a case study strategy, and collected both primary and secondary data using document analysis, key informant interviews and focus group discussions sources and methods helped to reduce bias in the results. Situating mandates within the democratic environment where competitive elections determine who gets the mandate to rule, this study found that higher electoral competition within a fragmented party system in Malawi has brought insecurity to the ruling regimes and influenced instability of the policy marked by deviations from main development and policy frameworks. Stronger institutions influenced by strong leadership, grounded ideology and dominant party system in Tanzania have formed the bedrock for security to the ruling regime to formulate and implement policy with minimal distraction from pluralist forces. The mandate theory in Malawi has, therefore, influenced not only higher propensity for subsidies in the social sector but also distracted the design and implementation of such programmes. In Tanzania, mandate policies have not had an equal distractive effect on the main development frameworks. This study introduces party fragmentation to the debate on whether competitive party systems produce better policy or not. This charachteristic of competitive party system changes the perspective of analysing party systems and policy consequencies as more care has to be taken to avoid overgeneralisation of phenomena. Malawi’s continued prioritization of the mandate policies over medium and longterm development frameworks reawakens the debate on compatibility of long term planning and democracy. More research effort needs to be directed towards policy approaches where public goods are prioritized to enhance solidality as well as community and individual capacities so that people can afford to acqure commodities on their own or collectively.